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Summary
International migration in recent years has been described as being persistent,
with the movement of persons from one country to another being shown to be
continuous and large in scale. However, migration models have typically shown
how migration can lead to the reduction of the wage gap, leading to a convergence
in wages and, thus, removing any incentive to migrate and making migration tran-
sitory or temporary. Reichlin and Rustichini (1998) employ a model that allows
for persistent migration, relying on the size and composition of the workforce in
both the migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries to analyze migration
patterns. Thus, by employing the model they introduce, we aim to study persis-
tent migration and the issues underlying the process. In Chapter 2, we adopt their
model when there is one type of labor, endogenize the migration choice and intro-
duce a probability of migration, and find a similar result: scale effects is key in the
continued existence of a wage gap, leading to persistent migration as the incentive
to migrate does not disappear. We also note that the higher the probability of
migration, the higher the wages of the migrant-sending country relative to those
of the migrant-receiving country. We also assess the possibility of deferred as-
similation, i.e. when first-generation immigrants leave the adoption of the foreign
birth rate to their children, and we find that deferred assimilation is favorable for
the migrant-receiving country as they face higher wages than if assimilation were
immediate. In Chapter 3, we continue to adopt the model, but with two types
of labor and add an endogenous skill choice. We also consider the possibility of
migrating as an unskilled worker. We observe additional results in terms of both
the composition of labor (i.e., the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor) as well as
the unskilled-to-skilled wage ratios in each country. We find that skilled worker
migration leads to higher skilled-to-unskilled workforce ratios for both countries.
Unskilled worker migration lowers the skilled-to-unskilled workforce ratio for the
migrant-receiving country while skilled worker migration not only improves the
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wages of the migrant-sending country relative to those of the migrant-receiving
country but it also improves the unskilled-to-skilled wage ratio in each country. In
Chapter 4, we then consider the existence of networks and their role in propagat-
ing persistent migration based on the premise that network formation by previous
migrants leads to a higher probability for others to follow and migrate. This then
leads to persistent migration to occur even more while, at steady state, we find
that network effects can produce preferable results for either country depending
on how the probability of migration is determined by the existing network.
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Migration models have typically predicted the convergence of wages between two
countries or regions when a neoclassical growth model, with an assumption of
perfect capital mobility, is employed. As the workforce in the migrant-receiving
country increases due to the addition of migrant workers, the foreign wage de-
creases and as this continues to occur, the wage differential becomes nonexistent,
and the incentive to migrate simply disappears. Hence, in this scenario, labor
migration from one place to another becomes transitory or temporary. With the
neoclassical model, and with perfect capital mobility, the prediction is that the
direction of the flow of labor is opposite to the direction of the flow of capital,
which further lessens the wage differential and any incentive to migrate.
However, certain examples of labor migration across borders show that migra-
tion need not be temporary. The stock of migrants from Mexico in the United
States, for example, has been rising from the early 1900s until 2009, as shown in
Figure A.1, implying that there has been a steady inflow of migrants from Mexico.
To emphasize this point, Figure A.2 shows the steady inflow of migrants from
the year 1986, as well as the percentage of migrants from Mexico as a share of
total immigrants in the United States. The Mexico-U.S. migration pattern is of-
ten referred to as a migration “corridor” as the persistence of this migration flow
has led to the existence of around 11.6 million migrants in the United States in
year 2010. There are other persistent migration patterns that belong to the top
migration corridors in the world involving the United States. One is the inflow of
migrants from the Philippines and the other is that from India. Migration from
India to the U.S. began in the 1970s and migration from the Philippines began
in the 1980s.1 Both countries have a migrant stock of around 1.7 million people
1Source:Migration Policy Institute Data Hub, Washington, D.C., last viewed September 2010,
<http:\\www.migrationinformation.org/DataHub/historicaltrends.cfm>
3in the United States. Although, worldwide, no other migration corridor has ac-
cumulated a migrant stock as large as that of the Mexico-U.S. migration pattern,
other migration corridors do exist as a result of persistent migration. Table A.1
shows a list of migration corridors.2
While certain examples of migration from the late 1800s to the early 1900s
show that migration does not have to be persistent, given that certain migration
flows have been shown to have led to a form of convergence in wages3, the charac-
teristic of migration at present is that labor mobility seems to have a dampened
effect on wages, even with capital mobility. The “permanence” of the current
migration (Post-World War II) is among the issues that is surrounding debate on
migration today (Chiswick and Hatton, 2003). This permanence is more obvi-
ous in the migration corridors identified and the Mexico-U.S. flow, in particular,
will be analyzed in this study. That permanent migration is a puzzle is due to,
therefore, the presence of this characteristic in migration today, which is also not
predicted by the neoclassical growth model, which has been traditionally used in
studying migration.
Hence, with the onset of persistent migration in recent decades, it then became
imperative to address the issue that traditional migration models are not able to
show how this can exist. Faini (1996), Reichlin and Rustichini (1998), Larramona
and Sanso (2003) address this and, under different assumptions, are able to show
how persistent migration can occur where, even if there exists labor mobility, there
is no convergence.
Reichlin and Rustichini (1998) adopt the Arrow-Romer endogenous growth
model and show that, through the existence of scale effects, a divergence of wages
2The migrant stock provided in this table covers the years from 1960 to 2010.
3Examples are Scandinavian countries and Italy catching up to Great Britain and the United
States (Chiswick and Hatton, 2003).
4is possible when there is only one type of labor, even with the assumption of per-
fect capital mobility. When they make a distinction between skilled and unskilled
labor, they show that changes in the wage ratio not only depend on scale effects,
but also on the composition of labor in both countries and find that migration
may be beneficial to the sending country.4 Again, in this scenario, they identify
an equilibrium path where migration may continue to persist and, in some cases,
undergo a reversal, i.e. the flow may change its direction. Their results revolve
around the long-run patterns of the flow of migration depending on whether the
scale effect or the composition effect is stronger. In their model, however, the pro-
portion of the population that migrates at each time period is taken to be fixed
and, thus, ignores the effect that changes in the wage differential may have on the
number of migrants.
Faini (1996) specifically studies the literature on convergence, assessing the
prediction of the neoclassical model, where there is convergence when there is
factor mobility, as well as that of endogenous growth models, where divergence is
a possible result. The model presented assumes a two-period overlapping gener-
ations model and where production is comprised of two sectors. The first one is
that of the tradeable good and the second one is the non-tradeable good which
is used as an input to produce the tradeable good, along with labor and capital.
Increasing returns to scale is assumed. The study finds that with some level of
capital mobility, a more significant level of labor migrations leads to divergence
and, thus, more migration, while a lower level of labor migration leads to conver-
gence.
Larramona and Sanso (2003), on the other hand, also employ an endogenous
growth model to try to explain persistent migration. They use a production func-
tion introduced by Kemnitz (2001), which does not rely on scale effects, and they
4The composition of labor is defined as the ratio of skilled labor to unskilled labor.
5do not introduce a distinction between skilled and unskilled labor. They use
capital-labor ratios and assume that return migration is a possibility. They show
that, contrary to Reichlin and Rustichini (1998), migration does not have to be
detrimental to the sending country, with one type of labor, and that convergence
of growth rates may occur, but not necessarily the convergence of wages, which
results in permanent migration. In addition to this, they also assume that indi-
viduals get to choose the country where they plan to work and the country where
they plan to retire, with a variable indicating preference for their country of birth,
which then allows for the migration decision as well as the return migration deci-
sion to be endogenous.
One crucial result in the Reichlin-Rustichini model (1998) is the role of scale
effects, implying that a relatively larger workforce leads to a relatively higher wage.
In the model of homogenous labor, this is immediately apparent in the equilibrium
condition. Scale effects are exhibited in studies of economic growth due to Arrow
(1962), Lucas (1988), Romer (1986), Simon and Steinman (1984), Backus, et.al.
(1992), Jones (1995) and Di Maria (2009). In relation to migration, however, as
far as we know, empirical work on the role of scale effects on wages and migration
does not exist. While there exist studies on the effect on wages of immigration
and emigration, these do not necessarily make specific inferences to the increases
in the wage gap to be due to scale effects.
1.1.1 Decisions to Migrate and to Acquire Skill
As Larramona and Sanso (2003) have pointed out, however, not including the
decision to migrate based on changing wage differentials is a weakness of the mi-
gration literature.
6Other studies on migration that allow for the endogeneity of the migration
decision are those that have focused on the possibility of a brain drain and that
study the impact of migration on the growth of the sending country such as those
by Rodriguez (1975), Miyagiwa (1991), Mountford (1997) and Beine, et al. (2001).
These studies have typically focused on the sending country and describe equilib-
rium only according to the country that exports labor. Hence, the foreign wage is
assumed to be fixed. This, however, does not reflect the possibility of how foreign
wages change due to the inflow of migrants into the receiving countries.
Another note to be made is that most studies on migration do not make a
clear distinction between skilled and unskilled workers. This is another weakness
in the migration literature as current migration flows are a combination of both
highly-skilled workers as well as low-skilled workers.
Hence, these are two weaknesses in the literature which we address as we study
the process of persistent migration. Understanding how changing wages may affect
the level of potential migrants as well as their level of skill may enhance research
on persistent migration.
1.1.2 Probability of Migration
Research on the probability of migration or immigration quotas is scarce. There
are several factors that can determine the number of immigrants allowed to enter
a country but little has been studied. Factors such as family reunification or lob-
bying may affect immigration policy (Borjas, 1994; Amegashie, 2004). There has
been a study, for example, on how immigration quotas affect voting seeing that
one source of friction between immigrants and natives is the possibility of immi-
grants voting on national issues (Ortega, 2005). Another study looks at quotas and
how they affect the skill composition of the workforce (Belletini and Ceroni, 2007).
7Our inclusion of a probability of migration is to analyze the effects of “lim-
ited” immigration on persistent migration flows. By including a probability of
migration, whether interpreted as the ability to cross a border or a policy vari-
able imposed by the migrant-receiving country or even by the migrant-sending
country, we hope to analyze the different scenarios resulting from varied prob-
abilities of migration. In our model, the probability of migration is treated as
an exogenous variable and is treated as a policy variable, implying that it is the
migrant-receiving country’s decision of whether a potential migrant is eventually
able to migrate or not.
1.2 Remarks
We would like to point out important considerations regarding rural-urban mi-
gration, two-way migration, reverse migration and wage differentiation between
migrant and native workers.
Although models of international migration may generally be used to explain
rural-urban migration, the literature is kept quite separate as rural-urban migra-
tion issues involve aspects of urbanization and economic development.5 However,
this is not to imply that the model we employ may not be used to explain certain
aspects of rural-urban migration. For example, rural-urban migration may also
have a form of permanent migration. However, we adopt the view of persistent
migration occurring internationally where the emphasis is on a crossing of bor-
ders and, therefore, implies a higher cost of migration and in some cases a longer
distance (e.g. Philippines-U.S. and India-U.K.). For our model of heterogenous
labor, we also focus on the aspect of migration whereby the movement of labor
5An example of work on urbanization is that of Lucas (2004).
8may be applicable for only certain types of labor. In rural-urban migration flows,
there is no real issue of whether rural-urban migrants need to fulfill certain educa-
tion requirements and, thus, skill acquisition is not a focus. There is also no true
quota imposed on the rural-urban migration flow.
The issues we analyze can also be argued to play a more important role in
international migration. In the model we introduce, we assume a probability of
migration and this is highlighted more in international migration with the exis-
tence of immigration quotas and other immigration policies. We also emphasize
the process of applying for migration which involves a cost to the potential mi-
grant. The other issues of network effects and assimilation may also be argued to
be issues of a more elevated level when migration involves the crossing of borders.
While these are still part of rural-urban migration, they can be recognized as rel-
atively more complex issues when migration occurs internationally.
We also do not consider two-way migration. In certain migration corridors,
it may be observed that there is heavy emphasis on only one flow. While there
are, of course, instances where there is a process of migration between countries
that goes both ways, in most cases, only one way displays a significant volume
of migration flows. If we consider the Mexico-U.S., Philippines-U.S., India-U.S.
migration flows, migration from the U.S. to these countries is not considered a
migration corridor, i.e. volume is not massive and it also does not display any
persistence.
Reverse migration is also not tackled in this study. In recent years, there have
been more anecdotes of reverse or “returning” migration. There have been cases
where migrants have started returning to their home countries after a significant
length of time living as a “migrant” in the host country. While this may be true,
we are not going to include this process in the current analysis. This, however,
9may be studied in future research on migration as a strong possibility to return to
the home country may have a different impact on the migration decision, as well
as on the decision to acquire education.
The last aspect we would like to point out which we do not cover is the differ-
entiation of wages between migrants and the natives. In certain studies on wages,
this is of importance in the migration literature. However, the construction of the
model only allows us to focus on the home country’s wages and the host country’s
wages so we are currently unable to make any distinction. However, again, this
will be considered in future studies.
1.3 Contribution and Objectives
Given the discussion above, we would like to analyze the movement and changes in
wages under persistent migration by introducing a model of persistent migration
where there is an endogenous migration choice, and an endogenous skill choice in
the subsequent chapter. We also assess the role of varying probabilities of migra-
tion and by analyzing changes in the ratios of the host and home countries’ levels
of workforce and the effect on the wage differentials.
Thus, we adopt the dynamic, two-country model introduced by Reichlin and
Rustichini (1998) because of three useful points: (1) persistent migration is a pos-
sible result of their model, (2) the wage ratio between the sending and receiving
country changes as the inflow of migrants affects the workforce levels in both coun-
tries, and (3) they make a distinction between skilled and unskilled labor. From
this, we aim to achieve three objectives. First, in Chapter 2, from the strand of
the migration literature that studies the brain drain issue for the sending country,
by endogenizing the decision to migrate based on the wage ratio, which then leads
to the number of migrants also changing over time, we assess how the workforce
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ratio and the wage ratio changes accordingly, whether there is free or limited mi-
gration. We also include a short note on the possibility of deferred assimilation
by immigrants. Second, in Chapter 3 we also endogenize the decision to acquire
skill in the case where heterogenous labor is assumed, and assess the patterns of
migration for both unskilled and skilled labor. We also allow for different scenarios
resulting from different probabilities of migration given different skill levels, which
reflects a characteristic of immigration policies of migrant-receiving countries, in
that they are subject to the skill level they expect of their immigrants or of the
employment needs of their economies. We then analyze workforce ratios and wage
ratios and note their implications. And, third, in Chapter 4, we study the role that
network formation has on persistent migration by continuing to study workforce
and wage ratios. In all three chapters, we discuss the analytical results whenever
possible and include numerical simulations to enhance the studies.
When there is only one type of labor, we find that persistent migration gives
the migrant-sending country a relatively lower wage and the migrant-receiving
country a higher wage. With the existence of a probability of migration, however,
it is better for the migrant-receiving country to limit migration while it is prefer-
able for the migrant-sending country if there were no immigration quotas. We
also find that if immigrants choose to defer assimilating into the local culture and
leave the assimilation to their children, that those that were not able to migrate
will face lower wages while the immigrants themselves and the natives of the host
country will receive even higher wages than when assimilation is immediate.
When there are two types of labor, we have results concerning the composition
of labor (skilled-to-unskilled workforce ratio) as well as relative wages. We find
that if potential migrants are allowed to migrate as skilled workers, this results
into a higher skilled-to-unskilled workforce ratio for both the migrant-sending and
the migrant-receiving countries. The migrant-receiving country benefits even more
11
when they allow a higher level of skilled worker migration as well as limit unskilled
worker migration. In terms of relative wages, skilled worker migration is better for
both countries as the unskilled wage is closer to the skilled wage, reducing ‘wage
inequalities.’ The unskilled wage gap and the skilled wage gap between the two
countries also decreases with skilled worker migration, which is preferable for the
migrant-sending country as they are then receiving wages closer to those of the
migrant-receiving country.
When we consider that network formation occurs when there is persistent
migration, we find, that by analyzing how the probability of migration is increasing
in the proportion of the newborn population that could migrate in the previous
period, over time, the level of those that can migrate increases and the divergence
of wages is hastened. Hence, when there is one type of labor, the existence of
network effects leads the migrant-sending country to face relatively lower wages
over time. At steady-state, we find that the results may differ depending on
how networks are specified to affect the probability of migration. The slower the
occurrence of the network effect, the better for the migrant-sending country as a
faster occurring network effect lowers their wages at the steady-state. Hence, for
the migrant-receiving country, the faster the occurrence of the network effect, the
better, as they face relatively higher wages.
Chapter 2





Due to this existence of persistent migration or ‘large-scale migration’ (Borjas,
2009), there has been a resurgence of studies done on how migration flows affect
labor market outcomes, with the majority of the work being done on the U.S.
economy. Immigration in typical migrant-receiving countries has been cause for
some concern, as an influx of immigrants represents a labor-supply shock which
leads to lower equilibrium wages, and fewer employment opportunities for the
native-born.
Studies in this area have typically employed data-mining and regression method-
ologies, with quite contradictory claims. Recently, Borjas (2009) has attempted
to resolve this issue theoretically with the premise that most empirical work have
ignored factor demand theory; results show that factors such as the importance
of labor in production, the supply elasticity of capital, the elasticity of product
demand and the impact of immigration on the economy’s consumer base play a
role in wage effects.1
As solid theoretical work has not been as proliferate, results from empirical
studies have resulted into different outcomes. Some studies report to find a neg-
ative and significant effect on wages such as Borjas (2003), Mishra (2007) and
Peri and Sparber (2007). Other studies claim that the reason why wage effects
are negative is due to the assumption that immigrants and natives are perfect
substitutes. With this assumption relaxed for some studies, some have found that
wage effects are small to insignificant, giving the idea that immigration should not
be a cause for concern. Studies by Butcher and Card (1991), Card (2001; 2005),
Ottaviano and Peri (2006; 2008), Manacorda, et. al. (2006), Dustmann, et. al.
1Studies by Card (2001) and Borjas (2003) also adopt a different approach in determining
wage effects, with the former observing that wage effects are small and insignificant and the
latter noting that wage effects are significant and negative for workers of different skill-levels to
varying degrees.
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(2005), Friedburg and Hunt (1995) all claim that immigration does not adversely
affect national wages.2.
A recent study on European countries by Docquier, Ozden and Peri (2010) has
found that the wage effects are the opposite of what have been observed so far.
For the years 1990 - 2000, they have found that immigration has, in fact, had a
positive effect on average wages for native workers.
Hence, in this chapter, we aim to assess the effect of persistent migration on
the wage differential and workforce ratio between the migrant-sending and the
migrant-receiving countries. We analyze the impact of migration on the steady-
state wage ratio and workforce ratio for only one type of labor and include a brief
analysis of what may occur when assimilation, or the adoption of the foreign birth
rate by migrants, is delayed by one generation3.
We find that the higher the probability of migrating, with a model of endoge-
nous migration choice, gives a higher workforce ratio and a higher wage ratio.
This means that the proportion of the population that decides to migrate is lower
as in the steady state, the wage gap is smaller. Hence, while persistent migra-
tion leads to the migrant-sending country facing relatively lower wages, and the
migrant-receiving country facing relatively higher wages, the higher the probabil-
ity of migration, the better it is for the migrant-sending country. When we assess
the possibility of deferred assimilation, what we find is that whilst assimilation
issues have been a difficult challenge for immigrant countries, through this study,
failure to adjust birth rates is a burden to the migrant source country as in the long
2Manacorda, et. al. (2006) and Dustmann, et. al. (2005) are studies done on Britain, while
others are on the U.S. economy
3The wage ratio is the ratio between the wage of the migrant-sending country and the wage of
the migrant-receiving country. The workforce ratio is the ratio of the workforce in the migrant-
sending country to the workforce of the migrant-receiving country. These will be explained
further when the model is introduced and solved.
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run, those who choose not to migrate end up with relatively lower wages while the
migrant-receiving country ends up facing much higher wages than if assimilation
was immediate.
Section 2.2 discusses the model of homogenous labor, the results and the nu-
merical simulation results dependent on the probability of migration is less than
one. In Section 2.3, we discuss some results on the growth rate of wages and the
numerical analysis for how wages change under different probabilities of migration.
In Section 2.4, we analyze what occurs when assimilation into the foreign culture
is not immediate. And we conclude the findings of this chapter in Section 2.5.
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2.2 Model with Homogenous Labor
In this section, we introduce a dynamic, general equilibrium model of migration
which is based on the Reichlin and Rustichini (1998) model. It is a two-country
model with overlapping generations of individuals with perfect foresight that live
for two periods. Both countries face similar technologies and preferences and they
differ in initial capital endowments and birth rates. This model is close to Reichlin
and Rustichini’s model in its basic assumptions and the conditions for equilibrium.
The key modification in this model of homogenous labor is that individuals are
able to decide on whether they want to migrate at the beginning of the period
and face a given probability of successful migration application, or just stay in the
country of their birth. We treat the probability of migration as a policy variable,
similar to any potential migrant facing the possibility of being granted immigrant
status, and is, therefore, exogenous. A migrant-receiving country may have strict
immigration policies and the probability of migration can be very low, while some
may welcome more immigrants to fulfill job vacancies or as part of family reunifi-
cation programs for existing immigrants, where the probability may be high. The
endogeneity of the migration decision is based on the assumption that individuals
are born with different abilities to pay for the cost of migration. Any crossing of
borders calls for costs to be incurred. This may be due to the cost of the migration
application process, and the costs incurred after the move is made, i.e. adjustment
costs, initial accommodation costs and the cost of finding a job. Those that can
pay for the cost of migration are then potential migrants and the endogeneity of
this variable allows us to consider how changes in the relative wages affects the
flow of migrants in the next time period while still be able to explain the existence
of persistent migration.
We explain the model below, as adopted from Reichlin and Rustichini (1998),
which changes in how the proportion of the population that is able to migrate
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is determined. This is both through an endogenous migration choice as well as
introducing a probability of migration.
2.2.1 Technology
Firms in each country i face a Cobb-Douglas technology






1−α, α ∈ (0, 1), Ai > 0.
A learning-by-doing mechanism is adapted from Arrow (1962) and Romer
(1986) and assume that Ait = (K¯
i)ηt where K¯
i
t is aggregate capital and where
0 < η < 1− α. As firms are identical, we have Kit = K¯it and





Due to perfect competition, the returns to capital are





α+η−1 − δ (2.3)




t and δ is the depreciation rate. As explained in Reichlin and
Rustichini (1998), it is assumed that η < 1−α which “guarantees that the ‘social’
marginal product of physical capital is decreasing in the capital-labor ratio,” kit.
2.2.2 Household Behavior
At the beginning of each time period, there are N¯ it of newborn in each coun-
try. Each newborn a is born with a cost of applying for migration ca which is
uniformly distributed on space [0, 1]. Individuals provide labor when young and
consume when old and their utility is linear in second-period consumption. In
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this study, we adopt the assumption of Reichlin and Rustichini (1998) regarding
the specific form of the utility function. This enables us to reduce the migration
decision to be based strictly on wages and makes the model more tractable4
Below is the OLG structure for this model, where i = D,F .
Figure 2.1: OLG Structure with Homogenous Labor
At the beginning of each time period t, each individual then decides on whether
he wants to work in their home country or migrate and work in the foreign coun-
try. Each individual also faces an exogenous probability p of being accepted as a
potential migrant or not. The cost of migration in country i, ci, then has to be
incurred if the individual initiates the migration process and is incurred whether
or not the application is successful with a probability p. Hence, they will decide
to apply for migration from country i to country j as long as
[pwjt + (1− p)wit](1− ci) ≥ wit
4This is also true for the case where labor is heterogenous discussed in Chapter 3. Other
similar studies have considered different forms such as Larramona and Sanso (2003) who assume
that utility is of log-linear form and and is a function of both first and second-period consump-
tion. The migration decision is then based on a preference variable with a Pareto distribution
that renders the population heterogenous. Faini (1996) uses a CES utility function and with
a parameter representing the preference for location, the choice is also dependent primarily on
wages. As discussed in Chapter 1, the results of these related studies have some similarities
and differences with the Reichlin-Rustichini (1998) model and the specific form of the utility
function does not seem to play a largely significant role. The importance in this particular study
is that the choice of migration stems from the wage differential and that there is no convergence
is wages even with labor mobility.
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where ci is the constant marginal cost of the migration application process in coun-
try i, wjt is the wage of the host country and w
i
t is the wage of the home country.
The individual that can then migrate can earn wage wjt with a given probability
p or not be allowed to migrate with a probability (1− p) and earn wage wit.
2.2.3 Flow of Migrants and Evolution of Workforce
There will then be a critical level of cost ci∗ such that individuals with the cost ca
below this level choose to initiate the migration process. At the beginning of each
time period t, a proportion θit of the newborn population of country i, N¯
i
t , equal
to the critical level of cost, then decides to apply for migration where
θit = max{ci∗t , 0} (2.4)
where ci∗t =
p(wjt − wit)
pwjt + (1− p)wit
(2.5)
After the decision to apply for migration is made, an individual is successful
with the application process with a probability p so that the workforce for that
period in country i consists of those who remain in country i and migrants from
country j. Hence, in this model, both θit and p affect the changes in the workforces
over time, N it with θ
i
t being dependent on how the expected wage differential
changes over time.
N it = (1− pθit)N¯ it + pθjt N¯ jt (2.6)
For each country i, the given population growth rate is ni so that the newborn
at the beginning of the next period is N¯ it = (1+n
i)N it−1, which allows us to express
the evolution of country i’s workforce as
20
N it+1 = (1− pθit+1)(1 + ni)N it + pθjt+1(1 + nj)N jt (2.7)
This term is composed of those of the newborn of the current period that don’t
decide to migrate as well as those who decide to migrate but with a probability
of (1 − p) are not able to and of those who, with a probability p migrate to that
country.
2.2.4 Equilibrium
Similar to Reichlin and Rustichini (1998), we also define equilibrium to be a perfect
foresight equilibrium as well as make the same additional assumptions, as stated
below.
Definition 1. We define equilibrium to be a perfect foresight equilibrium for the
world economy and is a sequence {Kkt , Nkt , wkt , rkt , θkt , pklt ; t = 1, 2...}k,l=i,j which
satisfies the following equations ∀k, l = i, j:





(α+η−1) − δ (2.9)
Nkt+1 = (1− pθkt+1)(1 + nk)N it + pθlt+1(1 + nl)N lt (2.10)
θkt =
p(wkt − wlt)
















Eq.(2.12) follows from the assumption that total world savings from the previ-
ous period is equal to the world capital stock of the current period, and Eq.(2.13)
follows from the assumption of perfect capital mobility. This assumption of per-
fect capital mobility may be an extreme case; however, this enables us to focus on
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the changes of the wages and the wage differential. As discussed in Reichlin and
Rustichini (1998), in the neoclassical growth model, with perfect capital mobil-
ity, capital will flow towards the country with a higher return to capital and the
capital-labor ratios for each country will equalize, rendering wages equal as well.
Thus, the free mobility of capital reduces the wage gap and removes any incentive
to migrate. In this model, we continue to make this assumption as well to show
that this assumption in a model of increasing returns does not necessarily lead to
the reduction of the wage gap.5
2.2.5 Analysis and Results
From the assumption of perfect capital mobility, and Eqs.(2.2) and (2.3), we can
express the wage ratio as a function of the ratio between the workforce in country









where γ = η
1−α−η . From this expression, it can be noted that the wage ratio is an
increasing function in the workforce ratio and that the movement of labor from
country i to country j widens the wage gap. Hence, the possibility of persistent
migration relies primarily on scale effects. As Reichlin and Rustichini (1998) have
pointed out, if there was no externality and η = γ = 0, then this illustrates how
using the neoclassical model leads to the automatic equalization of wage rates and
causes migration to be temporary.
In the following analysis, we also assume that wjt > w
i
t and this restricts
5Faini (1996) and Larramona and Sanso (2003) use different technologies and assume that
capital mobility is less than fully mobile and achieve similar results, that is, that factor mobility
does not lead to convergence.
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the flow of migration from country i to country j6. This also implies that θit
is positive while θjt is zero. For ease of notation, we then let j = F to denote
the migrant-receiving country as the “foreign” country and i = D to denote the
migrant-sending country as the “domestic” country.
We also analyze the transition path of the workforce ratio instead of the new-









t . By analyzing the transition path of the workforce
ratio, we are able to assess the relation between changes in the workforce and
changes in the wage rate in a more straightforward manner. We show that the
workforce ratio and the newborn population ratio are topologically equivalent to
carry out the analysis.
Lemma 1. Let φt+1 = f(φt) and λt+1 = g(λt), then the discrete dynamical systems
of functions f and g are topologically equivalent.
Proof. Because we assume that one wage rate is larger than the other, then if




















Hence, for all time periods t, the mapping h : R+ → R+ is one-to-one and
6In Reichlin and Rustichini (1998) it is assumed that N jt > N
i
t , which also implies the same
condition on wages. Due to the assumption of increasing returns, the total workforce and the
capital per worker have a positive effect on wages and we want to have a simple condition
that will incite the movement of workers from country j to country i. Hence, we simplify this
restriction based on wages and not on capital per worker. The same is true for the model
where the workforce is heterogenous, as discussed in Chapter 3. In addition to this, Faini (1996)
discusses that the literature on trade theory, a wage differential causes migration to occur.
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continuous and h−1 is continuous.




t and letting µ = (1 + n
D)/(1 + nF ) and from Eqs. 2.4
and 2.7, we can then solve for the following system of equations that describe the










Eq. (2.18) is the main difference of this model with that of Reichlin and
Rustichini (1998) since, in this case, θt changes over time and is a function of the
expected workforce ratio and, hence, the wage ratio, while this is taken to be fixed
in their study.
Case: p = 1
In this case, we assume that the probability of migration is equal to one for all
time periods. Hence, the system of equations can be simplified to
λt =
λγt µλt−1
1 + µλt−1(1− λγt )
(2.19)
And at steady state, we can find
µ(λ− λ1+γ − λγ) = −1 (2.20)
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We apply a first-order Taylor approximation on Eq.(2.20) to the function λt =
g(λt−1) in the neighborhood of steady-state λ. And by Implicit Function Theorem,
we find g′(λt−1) to be
g′(λt−1) = − µ(λt − λ
1+γ
t − λγt )
1 + µ(λt − (1 + γ)λt−1λγt − γλt−1λγ−1t )
(2.21)
And at steady state, we have
g′(λ) =
−µ(λ− λ1+γ − λγ)
1 + µ(λ− (1 + γ)λ1+γ − γλγ) (2.22)
Proposition 1. For any λ0 ∈ (0, 1), γ > 0, and µ, if µ > 1, then there exists a
perfect foresight equilibrium such that, for all t ≥ 0, and for two constants c1 and
c2, where c1, c2 > 0,
wFt
wDt




≤ c2 < 1 (2.23)
Proof. The above proposition follows from Eqs. (2.17) and (2.18). When λt ∈
(0, 1), in any perfect foresight equilibrium, it must be that θt ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the
migration flow will just be from country D to country F .
Since we can find a fixed point λ∗ given by Eq.(2.20), and since (λ−λ1+γ−λγ) ∈
(−1, 0), λ∗ is also less than 1 if µ > 1. This implies that the workforce ratio
remains strictly below 1 and the wage ratio remains strictly larger than 1. Thus,
the function given by Eq.(2.19) generates a perfect foresight equilibrium where
the flow of migrants is from country D to country F .
Proposition 2. If µ > 1, then for any γ > 0, there exists a steady-state solution
λ∗.
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Proof. From Eq.(2.20), it is immediate that for any value of µ > 1, the term
(λ− λ1+γ − λγ) has to be equal to a value less than 1. In which case, it must be
that steady-state λ∗ ∈ (0, 1). Since θ = (1− λγ) when p = 1, then θ ∈ (0, 1).
This implies that at the steady state, there is a proportion θ∗ of the domestic
population that will migrate from country D to country F because λ∗ < 1. For
this to occur, the population growth rate of country D has to be larger than that of
country F in order to sustain this movement of labor. This result is similar to that
of Reichlin and Rustichini in that the migrant-source country has to have a larger
birth rate in order to sustain the movement of migrants to the migrant-receiving
country, given that the latter has higher wages. In this case, when λ ∈ (0, 1) at
steady state, ND < NF and, thus, wD < wF rendering migration persistent.
We then assess the local stability properties of this nonlinear system below. In
the analysis done by Reichlin and Rustichini (1998) in their model of homogenous
labor, they find that the steady-state workforce ratio displays divergence. This is
a quite straightforward result as the flow of migrants from country D to country
F will continuously give the migrant-sending country a relatively lower workforce,
and the migrant-receiving country a relatively higher workforce. In the case of this
model where we have made the migration choice endogenous, however, and the
proportion of migrants, θ can, thus, change over time due to the changes in wages,
we find that this local stability properties may differ depending on the values of
γ and µ.7
Proposition 3. For λ∗ ∈ (0, 1), µ ∈ (1, 2) and any γ > 0, there are three possible
cases:
(1) there is monotonic divergence away from λ∗ when µ(λ− (1 + γ)λ1+γ − γλγ) ∈
(−1, 0),
7This will be explored more in Section 2.2.6
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(2) there are explosive oscillations when µ(λ− (1+γ)λ1+γ−γλγ) ∈ (−2,−1), and
(3) there are damped oscillations when µ(λ− (1 + γ)λ1+γ − γλγ) < −2.
Proof. We first show that g′(λ) 6= 1 to apply the Hartman-Grobman theorem on
local stability properties of nonlinear systems. We use the condition from the
steady state, from Eq. (2.20) to simplify Eq.(2.22) to
g′(λ) =
1
1 + µ(λ− (1 + γ)λ1+γ − γλγ) (2.24)
To show that g′(λ) 6= 1, we need to show that µ(λ − (1 + γ)λ1+γ − γλγ) 6= 0.
For g′(λ) = 1, the term (λ−(1+γ)λ1+γ−γλγ) has to be equal to 0 since µ ∈ (1, 2).
Since γ > 0, λ ∈ (0, 1), (λ− (1 + γ)λ1+γ − γλγ) 6= 0 and g′(λ) 6= 1.
We then need to show that g′(λ) is well-defined. Note that the term µ(λ− (1+
γ)λ1+γ−γλγ) cannot be equal to−1. From Eq.(2.20), for µ(λ−(1+γ)λ1+γ−γλγ) =
−1 to hold, it must be that γ = 0 and, also, that γ = 1, which cannot be true.
Hence, µ(λ− (1 + γ)λ1+γ − γλγ) 6= 1.
Thus, for any µ ∈ (1, 2), λ ∈ (0, 1) and any γ > 0, (λ− (1 + γ)λ1+γ − γλγ) <
0 and conditions for monotonic divergence, explosive oscillations, and damped
oscillations are then immediate from Eq.(2.22).
Comparative Statics
From the implicit function G = µ(λ−λ1+γ −λγ) + 1 = 0, we analyze how steady-
state λ changes with respect to the parameters µ, the ratio of birth rates, and γ,
the parameter that is a function of the externality, given the relative shares of K
and L to output.
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By Implicit Function Theorem, we can find the following partial derivatives
∂λ
∂µ
= − (λ− λ
1+γ − λγ)
µ(1− (1 + γ)λγ − γλγ−1) (2.25)




(λ1+γ − λγ) lnλ)
(1− (1 + γ)λγ − γλγ−1) (2.26)
From the possible values of the parameters µ, γ and steady-state λ, we note
that ∂λ
∂µ
< 0, which implies that at a lower steady state λ, i.e., that at a larger
difference between the two countries’ workforces, a higher ratio of birth rates is
needed to sustain the transfer of people as, in addition to this, with a lower steady-
state λ, the proportion of the domestic population that migrates, θ, is higher. This
describes the movement of people in the very simple scenario where the pattern
of migration is from one country to another. A lower workforce ratio implies a
larger wage gap, and hence a larger proportion of migrants, and a birth rate ratio
higher than one is needed for this movement to be sustained.
For the next two equations, we note that ∂λ
∂γ
> 0. This implies that a higher
value for γ or, since γ = η/(1−α− η), the higher the value of the externality, the
steady-state workforce ratio and, consequently, the steady state wage differential
are also higher. Hence, the size of the externality plays a role in the basic result
of the homogenous model. From Eq.(2.14), when γ has a higher value, for a given
workforce ratio, the wage differential is higher. Hence, when η, the externality is
higher, the wage ratio is higher, which implies that the wage differential is smaller.
Hence, a higher externality results in a smaller proportion of migrants. This can
be attributed to the marginal product of labor being higher when the externality
28
is of a larger value.
For a clearer analysis, we discuss the range of values for γ and µ that illustrates
this in Section 2.2.6.
Case: p ∈ (0, 1)
We now consider the scenario when the probability of migrating is less than one.
In this case, there is a certain proportion of the population that intends to migrate,
but only a given probability p will be allowed to migrate, which more closely re-
flects how immigration policies in most countries are carried out. This is another
modification of the Reichlin-Rustichini model as a limit is now imposed on the
proportion of the population that can migrate.








p+ (1− p)λγ (2.28)
We can then re-arrange to arrive at this function
G = 1 + pθµλ− (1− pθ)µ = 0 (2.29)
where Eq. (2.28) still applies.
From Eq.(2.29), we then find that




This implies that for a positive p, λ and γ, it must be that µ ∈ (1, 2), which is
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similar to the case where p = 1.
However, in this case, we cannot analytically find a particular range for p where
λ can be restricted to be between 0 and 1. This will be discussed in Section 2.2.6.
We then find ∂λ
∂p
to assess how a lower probability (i.e. p < 1) affects this














(p+ (1− p)λγ)2 (2.32)














(p+ (1− p)λγ)2 (2.34)












We note that, from Eq. (2.34) that ∂θ
∂p
> 0 since λ > 0, p > 0 and, hence,
(1 − λγ) > 0 and (1 − p) > 0, which implies that the higher the possibility of
migration and the higher the possibility of earning the higher foreign wage, then




< 0, which implies that the smaller the expected workforce ratio
(or the larger the difference between the domestic wage and foreign wage), then
the higher the proportion of potential migrants.
Thus, from Eq. (2.34), since µ(θ + ∂θ
∂p
p)(1 + λ) > 0, we have two possible
scenarios for how the probability of migration affects the workforce ratio λ at the
steady-state depending on the sign of pµ(θ + ∂θ
∂λ
(1 + λ)) as ∂θ
∂λ





(1 + λ) > θ and (2)∂λ
∂p
< 0 if ∂θ
∂λ
(1 + λ) < θ. We see how both these cases occur
given certain parameter values in Section 2.2.6. This implies two possible behav-
iors by which the newborn population deciding on who migrates or not responds
to changes in the steady-state workforce ratio. If, as in the first case, θ is more
responsive to the expected workforce ratio λ, i.e. the lower the expected work-
force ratio (and the larger the wage differential), then the proportion of those who
can migrate decreases relatively more. In this case, an increase in the probability
of migrating, then leads to a higher workforce ratio, implying that the number
of migrants, pθ, will increase. In the second case, if θ is then less responsive to
changes in the steady-state workforce ratio, then an increase in the probability
of migrating will lead to a lower workforce ratio, implying that the number of
migrants, pθ, decreases.
2.2.6 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we discuss examples of the range of values for the parameters γ
and µ that display the behavior of λ∗, the steady-state workforce ratio for two
cases: when p = 1 and when p ∈ (0, 1).
For this analysis, since µ = (1 + nD)/(1 + nF ), with nD, nF ∈ (0, 1), then
µ ∈ (1, 2). We then limit the values of µ to be µ ∈ (1, 2) following Proposition 1
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for the case when p = 1 as well as for when p ∈ (0, 1) from the discussion above.
The parameter γ can be any number between (0,∞), and to simplify, we choose
γ ∈ (0, 20).8 With n being the number of elements in each vector of these param-
eters, we choose n = 50.9
Case: p = 1
Figure B.1 illustrates how steady-state λ changes with respect to µ and γ. This
shows what was discussed earlier, with ∂λ
∂µ
< 0, and ∂λ
∂γ
> 0, from Eqs. (2.25)
and (2.26). Thus, steady-state λ is decreasing in µ, the workforce ratio, and is
increasing in γ, with steady-state λ always having a value between (0, 1). This
verifies the role of the migrant-sending country having the higher birth rate and,
also, the role of the size of the externality in lowering the workforce ratio.
Figure B.2 then illustrates how g′(λ) changes with respect to µ and γ. From
Proposition 3, it is possible for there to be divergence, explosive oscillations or
damped oscillations, depending on which condition is satisfied as stated in the
proposition. From the graph, it can be observed that for values of γ very close to
0, for any value of µ, divergence and explosive oscillations are the more possible
cases. However, for larger values of γ, the typical scenario is for steady-state λ to
display damped oscillations.
This is different from the result found by Reichlin and Rustichini (1998)
wherein for a similar condition of µ ∈ (0, 1), steady-state λ displayed monotonic
divergence or monotonic convergence - in the case where the migration flow may
8The values for the parameter γ = η/(1− α− η) are determined from the the possible range
of values of α ∈ (0.2, 0.5) and the externality η ∈ (0.1, 1− α).
9The numerical simulations are done through MATLAB. The exercise was run numerous
times to verify that the movement of the variables is not dependent on the number of elements
in the set of possible values for the parameters. Hence, we limit n = 50 for a more efficient
analysis.
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reverse. Hence, in this case, having migration as an endogenous choice leads to
different local stability properties of the steady-state workforce ratio.
In later exercises, we specify the values of the parameters to be µ = 1.011,
α = 0.3, η = 0.2 and γ = 0.4. We specify µ based on the average birth rates of
Mexico and the United States from the years 1960 to 200910. Using these values,
we find the steady-state value of the workforce ratio, λ, to be close to 1, and the
stability property is monotonic divergence which reiterates the Reichlin-Rustichini
(1998) result. Using Eq. (2.19), Figure B.6 shows the relationship between λt and
λt−1, which exhibits monotonic divergence away from the steady-state given the
parameters chosen.
Case: p ∈ (0, 1)
We then allow the probability of migrating to be less than one to observe in what
range of probabilities permanent migration can still be expected to occur from
country D to country F . We use the same parameter specifications as those used
when p = 1.
Figure B.3 shows us how λ∗ changes with respect to µ and γ when p = 0.80.
The behavior of λ∗ with respect to γ and µ when p < 1 is similar to the case when
p = 1.
However, upon checking for the robustness of this exercise for the values cho-
sen for the parameters γ and µ, this similarity in behavior of steady-state λ for
the same specified range of values of γ and µ only occurs for higher probabilities,
specifically when p > 0.60. This implies that we can expect a similar behavior
towards permanent migration from country D to country F only if the probability
of migration is high enough, at least for the range of values specified for γ and
10Source: World Development Indicators (2010)
33
µ. We can infer that for lower probability values, after some time periods, the
incentive to apply for migration is not high enough as there is a lower chance of
being accepted as a migrant and, hence, a relatively greater part of the popula-
tion will choose not to apply for migration and so the one-direction flow cannot
be sustained.11
The Role of Probabilities in the Workforce Ratio
We also look at the workforce ratio at steady state, λ, and how it depends on the
probability of migration, p. For this numerical analysis, similar to the previous ex-
ercise, we set µ = 1.011, α = 0.3, η = 0.2, which leads to a γ = η/(1−α−η) = 0.4.
We use the average birth rates of Mexico and the United States over 60 years and
the ratio is 1.011.12 This ratio of birth rates is also similar to that of Philippines-
U.S., and Bangladesh-India, which are also established migration corridors. Al-
though other cases of persistent migration exist where the ratio of birth rates may
be less than one, we focus on the case where the migrant-sending country has a
higher birth rate than the migrant-receiving country due to the result from Propo-
sition 1, where µ > 1, and the discussion on µ when the probability of migration
is less than one. 13
Figure B.5 shows us that steady-state λ is increasing in p, which implies
that for this set of parameters, ∂λ
∂p
> 0, from the discussion involving Equations
(2.31),(2.33) and (2.35). This implies that when the probability of migrating ap-
proaches 1, λ also approaches 1, or the workforce level in country D is close to
the workforce level in country F . As the probability of migration increases, for
11In the following exercises, when we focus on specific values for γ and µ, rather than consid-
ering a range of values, we will find that p > 0 will work for the model of homogenous labor.
12Source: World Development Indicators, 2010
13Due to the very small differences in µ for other migration corridors in the numerical exercise,
we decide to focus on the Mexico-U.S. migration flow. Also, it is the migration flow studied the
most in the migration literature and may be of more interest. In addition, results may be easily
compared.
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Table 2.1: Robustness Checks for Homogenous Labor Model




α = 0.3, η = 0.25, γ = 0.625
Check 1b
µ = 1.008
α = 0.3, η = 0.25, γ = 0.625
Check 2a
α = 0.32
η = 0.2, γ = 0.4167, µ = 1.011
Check 2b
α = 0.28
η = 0.2, γ = 0.3846, µ = 1.011
Check 3a
η = 0.22
α = 0.3, γ = 0.4583, µ = 1.011
Check 3b
η = 0.18
α = 0.3, γ = 0.3462, µ = 1.011
the workforce ratio to be at steady-state, there will be fewer individuals applying
for migration. Even if the probability of migrating is quite high, relatively fewer
move from country D to country F leading λ to be closer to 1.
Robustness Checks
We conduct robustness checks on the results by slightly changing µ, α and η and,
thus, γ and compare the steady-state λ for different probabilities. We increase
and decrease each of the parameters by 0.2, µ is changed by .003 since we want
to keep it above 1, due the the result of Proposition 2, and run the same analysis.
The different sets of parameters are listed in Table 2.1 and describe the results
below as well as in Figures B.7, B.8 and B.9 in the Appendix.
For robustness checks 1a and 1b, we vary the value of µ by +0.003 and by
-0.003. Hence, γ is unchanged. It can be noted that the resulting steady-state λ is
higher when µ is lower and is lower when µ is higher for every probability p. Since
a lower µ indicates a relatively lower birth rate for country D, this implies that
a lower birth rate leads to a lower proportion applying for migrants and, thus, a
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relatively higher remaining workforce.
For robustness checks 2a and 2b, we vary the value of α by +0.02 and by -0.02.
This leads to a different value of γ, even if η is unchanged. The differences in the
resulting steady-state λ is smaller than when µ was varied. A higher α leads to
a higher γ, and a higher γ leads to a higher steady-state λ, as shown in Figure B.8.
For robustness checks 3a and 3b, we vary the value of η by +0.02 and by -0.02.
This also changes the value of γ, even if α remains the same. A higher η leads to
a higher γ, which also leads to a higher steady-state λ for every probability p in
Figure B.9.
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2.3 Movement and Changes in Wages with Ho-
mogenous Labor
In this section, we assess how wages change given a model of persistent migration.
The exercise is quite simple as the wage ratio is simply dependent on the workforce
ratio from Eq.(2.14). We start by first looking at the growth rates of both the
workforce of country D and of country F and, as a result of that, the growth
rates of the wages wD and wF . We then run numerical simulations on the steady-
state wage ratio, as an extension of the basic numerical analysis conducted in the
previous section.
2.3.1 Analysis and Results
Since NDt+1 = (1 − pθt+1)(1 + nD)NDt , the growth rate of domestic workforce,




= (1− pθt+1)(1 + nD)− 1 (2.36)
As for the foreign workforce, since NFt+1 = (1 + n
F )NFt + pθt+1N
D
t+1, then the








In Eqs.(2.36) and (2.37), it can be noted that the growth rate of the workforce
in country D is dependent only on its birth rate and the proportion of emigrants,
whereas the growth rate of the workforce in country F is not only dependent on
its own birth rate but also country D’s birth rate due to the term NDt+1. It is also
a function of the proportion of immigrants. This is a result of persistent migration
that is one-directional, due to the assumption on wages. We present some basic
results below to better understand the analysis on wages.
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Lemma 2. For all time periods t, gND > 0 and there are three possible cases for
gND : (1) gND > 0 if n
D > pθt
1−pθt , (2) gND = 0 if n
D = pθt
1−pθt , and (3) gND < 0 if
nD < pθt
1−pθt .
Proof. We can express Eq.(2.36) as gND = n
D − pθtnD − pθt. Hence, we can see if
gND is greater than, equal to or less than zero by the relation of n
D to pθt/(1−pθt)
as gND > 0 if n
D(1− pθ) > pθ.
The above result on gND implies that the labor force of country D at time
period t may be larger than its labor force in the previous period if the popula-
tion growth rate is larger than the ratio of emigrants to the remaining workforce.
Thus, if the population growth rate is large enough to make up for the emigrants
leaving country D, then it will have a larger workforce in the current time period
compared to the previous time period.
Lemma 3. For all time periods t, gNF > 0.
Proof. From Eq. (2.37), since nF > 0 and pθt
NDt
NFt−1
= pθ− (1− pθt)(1 +nD)λt > 0,
then gNF > 0.
This implies that due to the persistent flow of migrants from country D into
country F , the workforce of country F constantly grows positively. Therefore, the
change in the ratio of the levels of the workforce of country D to country F is
dependent on the growth rate of country D’s workforce as they may have three
different scenarios. Another result below is an observation regarding the ratio of
birth rates.




) for some time period t, then λt = λt−1.
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= λt−1, it must be that, based on Lemma 3, gND =
gNF>0 for time t. This results into the following equation.
(1− pθt)(1 + nD)− 1 = nF = pθt(1− pθt)(1 + nD)λt (2.38)









The above result simply states that a specific value of µ may lead to a zero
change in the workforce ratio and, hence, no change in the wage differential. This
implies that if the ratio of birth rates is equal to the proportion of migrants that
leave country D to go to country F as well as the newborn of country F , then the
newborn of period t simply covers the loss of workforce in period t − 1 and the
addition of newborn in country F .
As for the wage rates, the domestic wage rate is given as wDt = (1−α)(NDt )−α(KDt )α+η.
We then calculate for the domestic wage growth rate as gwD = −αgND+(α+η)gKD
where gKD is the growth rate of capital in country D.
The foreign wage rate is given as wFt = (1 − α)(NFt )−α(KFt )α+η. The growth
rate of the wage of country F is then gwF = −αgNF + (α + η)gFD where gKF
is the growth rate of capital in country F . Substituting the workforce growth
rates of both countries D and F int the wage growth rates, we have the following
equations.
gwD = −α[(1− pθt)(1 + nD)− 1] + (α + η)[gKD ] (2.39)
gwF = −α[nF + pθt(1− pθt)(1 + nD)λt−1] + (α + η)[gFD ] (2.40)
Recall that for this model, we assume perfect capital mobility for all time peri-
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ods. Hence, rDt = r
F
t ∀t. Since for each country i, we have rit = α(N it )η(kit)(α+η−1)−
δ, the interest growth rate is grD = (1 − α)[gND ] + (α + η − 1)[gKD ]. Because of
perfect capital mobility, then for all time periods t, grD = grF , which gives us
another result.
It may then be noted that the difference in the changes between the workforces
of countries D and F , (gNF − gND), is simply a function of the difference in the
changes between the countries’ capital stocks, (gKD − gKF ) at each time period t.
This is due to the assumption on perfect capital mobility. Since grD = grF , we can
equate both and re-arrange to find (gNF − gND) = (α−η−11−α )(gKD − gKF ).
From Lemmas 2 and 3 on the growth rate of the workforces, we can then make
observations regarding the growth rates of wages.
Proposition 4. Let gFN > 0 ∀t, then there are three possible cases for gwD :
(1)gwF > 0 if (
α+η
α
)[gKF ] > gNF ,
(2)gwF = 0 if (
α+η
α
)[gKF ] = gNF ,and
(3)gwF < 0 if (
α+η
α
)[gKF ] < gNF .
Proof. From Lemma 3, gFN > 0 ∀t. The size of the growth rate of the foreign wage
is is immediate from Eq.(2.39).
For the growth rate of the wage of country D, there are many more possibilities
since the growth rate of the domestic workforce has three possible cases.
Proposition 5. If gDN > 0, then (1)gwD > 0 if (
α+η
α
)[gKD ] > gND , (2)gwD = 0 if
(α+η
α
)[gKD ] = gND , (3)gwD < 0 if (
α+η
α
)[gKD ] < gND .
If gDN = 0, then (1)gwD > 0 if (
α+η
α
)[gKD ] > 0, (2)gwD = 0 if (
α+η
α
)[gKD ] = 0,
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(3)gwD < 0 if (
α+η
α
)[gKD ] < 0.
If gDN < 0, then (1)gwD > 0 if (
α+η
α
)[gKD ] > −gND , (2)gwD = 0 if (α+ηα )[gKD ] =
−gND , (3)gwD < 0 if (α+ηα )[gKD ] < −gND .
Proof. This is immediate from Eq.(2.40).
2.3.2 Numerical Analysis
From Eq. 2.14, it can be noted that the steady-state wage ratio is an increasing
function of λ, hence, we can calculate the wage ratio for every probability p of
migrating given certain values of µ and γ. Figure B.10 in Appendix C shows us
the wage ratios given µ = 1.011 and γ = 0.4, the same parameters used in Section
2.2.6.
It can be noted that the higher the probability of migration (or the higher the
immigration quota), the higher the steady-state workforce ratio, λ, and, thus, the
higher or the closer to 1 the wage ratio, w
D
wF
at steady-state. At very high levels of
allowed immigration, at steady-state, there is then a lower proportion of migrants
due to the wage differential being closer to zero. Hence, for the migrant-sending
country, a higher probability of migrating allows it to have a wage that is closer
to the foreign wage, while the migrant-receiving still receives a relatively higher
wage.
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2.4 The Possibility of Deferred Assimilation
In this section, we introduce the possibility of immigrants experiencing assimila-
tion into the local culture one generation later as their adoption of the birth rate
of the foreign country occurs one period later. In the current model, assimilation
is assumed to be immediate. We, thus, consider the idea that assimilation may be
deferred by one time period and assess the results.
The ease at which immigrants integrate themselves into the foreign country’s
cultures, norms and practices may sometimes be a very sensitive but also ex-
tremely difficult issue, especially for the migrant-receiving country. The presence
of immigrants normally brings about questions of job security, impact on natives’
wages and employment opportunities. It is, however, the addition of the possi-
bility of immigrants being unable to assimilate into the culture that can bring
immigration issues to the fore and be a cause for debate in political agendas. The
difficulties that exist in dealing with differences between immigrant groups and
natives, however, are not very well understood from an economic perspective.
Few of the earlier works on immigrant assimilation deal more with how long
it takes for newly-arrived immigrants to earn as much as those who had arrived
years before and also as compared to the native workers (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas,
1985). These studies are, therefore, more concerned with assimilation in the labor
market. In terms of other means of immigrant assimilation and the economic im-
pact of the different processes of assimilation taken by immigrant groups, there is
really an absence of thorough studies done.
In this chapter, we focus on the birth rate or the fertility of immigrants. Re-
search in this area has focused primarily on demography and less on the economic
impact; however, there are some interesting insights which might be useful to ex-
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plore in the study of persistent migration. There exist studies which have looked
at how fertility and migration are related, basically finding that immigrants that
have settled in areas with lower fertility rates tend to adopt those fertility rates
even if they have emigrated from areas that have higher fertility rates (Ahlburg
and Jensen, 2004). While studies in the demographic literature have attributed
this change in behavior to being distinct from spouses, or to a basic disruption
of their normal lives, some have also associated this change in fertility rates to
changes in the economic environment, i.e. prices and wages. Immigrants have
been found to simply adapt due to the receipt of higher wages and a higher family
income leading to a choice of changing their lifestyles to mirror the lifestyles of
the natives that they interact with (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1985).14
Therefore, in this section, we introduce this idea of deferred assimilation into
the baseline model. In the earlier model, we assume that assimilation, i.e. adapt-
ing to the migrant-receiving country’s birth rate, is immediate, i.e. it occurs for the
first-generation migrants. First-generation migrants immediately have the same
birth rate as the natives as soon as they are able to migrate. However, we would
like to explore the effect of having the immigrants delay their assimilation into
the native culture by maintaining their birth rate for one generation. Hence, the
immigrants maintain the birth rate of their home country but their children, the
second-generation migrants adopt the birth rate of the destination country and,
hence, assimilation is deferred by one time period.
14This study has looked at rural-urban migration; however, the basic premise is the same in
that migration caused by an expectation to receive higher wages affects fertility rates to be lower
or there is a need to adapt to the fertility rates of the area they are migrating to.
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2.4.1 Model of Homogenous Labor with Deferred Assimi-
lation
We reflect this deferred assimilation through the birth rate, with the migrants still
maintaining their birth rate nD until they die and with their children adopting
the foreign birth rate nF as soon as they are born. Hence, adoption of the foreign
population growth is delayed by one generation as opposed to immediate assimi-
lation that was assumed earlier and occurs at time period (t + 1) for immigrants
of time period t.
In the model presented, the foreign workforce was composed of the native




t . The new-
born population is then simply the birth rate multiplied by the previous period’s
workforce, N¯Ft = (1 + n
F )NFt−1 implying that the entire workforce of the previous
period, including both the natives and the migrants, had the same birth rate.
Under this model, we now assume that the adoption of the foreign birth rate
is delayed by one generation. Hence, the newborn is expressed as
N¯Ft = (1 + n
F )N¯Ft−1 + (1 + n
D)θt−1N¯Dt−1. (2.41)
The equation is made up of two terms explaining that the newborn at time
period t includes the children of the natives, N¯Ft−1 born with the foreign birth rate,
and the children of the migrants, θt−1N¯Dt−1 born with the domestic birth rate.
2.4.2 Workforce Evolution with Assimilation
The primary equation affected by this assumption is the workforce ratio, λt. With
deferred assimilation, the workforce ratio is now expressed as
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λt =
(1− θt)(1 + nD)NDt−1
(1 + nF )N¯Ft−1 + (1 + nD)θt−1N¯
D




This can then be simplified to
λt =
(1− θt)µλt−1





is the proportion of natives in the workforce of the previous
period and mt =
θt−1N¯Dt−1
NFt−1
is the proportion of migrants in the workforce of the
previous period. And, also, where θt = (1 − λγt ). Here, we simplify the analysis
by assuming that p = 1.
2.4.3 Analysis and Results
We then analyze this model of deferred assimilation under steady state. At steady





where ω = n+ µm and θ = 1− λγ. The analysis here is somewhat similar to the
analysis of the case when p = 1 under homogenous labor. We can first observe the
main parameter that needs to change for this homogenous model with deferred
assimilation to hold, as discussed below.
Proposition 6. Let λ ∈ (0, 1), γ > 0 and µa ∈ (1, 2) where µa is the ratio of birth
rates under a model of deferred assimilation, then µa > µ.
Proof. Given the steady state Eq. (2.44), we may derive the following equation
µa(λ
γ + λ1+γ − λγ) = −ω (2.45)
Since λ ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 0, it must be that (λγ + λ1+γ − λγ) ∈ (−1, 0). We
note that since n is the proportion of natives in the workforce of country F and
45
m is the proportion of migrants in the workforce of country F , then it must be
that n+m = 1. Since µ ∈ (1, 2), then ω = n+ µm > 1.
For (λγ + λ1+γ − λγ) ∈ (−1, 0), it must be that µa > ω, and since ω > 1, we
have µa > µ.
At this point, it must be noted that Proposition 3 applies in this model as well
since we can find the following equation.
g′(λ) = − µ(λ− λ
1+γ − λγ)
ω + µ(λ− (1− γ)λ1+γ − γλγ) (2.46)
This is similar to Eq.(2.24) and implies that the system of equations have the
same local stability properties, except that for the same λ and γ, we note that µa
is higher but still within the range (0, 1).
We can also observe what happens to the steady-state workforce ratio in the
case of deferred assimilation.
Proposition 7. Let γa = γ, µa = µ, then for ω > 1, λa < λ.
Proof. From Equation (2.24) and from Proposition 3, we observed that µa > µ if
steady-state λ is to hold from the baseline model.
Hence, for ω very close to 1, then for the same γ and a larger µ, then it must
be that (λ− λ1+γ − λ)a < (λ− λ1+γ + λ).
Since we have (λ− λ1+γ − λ) ∈ (−1, 0) for λ ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 0, then the term
(λ−λ1+γ−λ) must be closer to zero, in which case, it has to be that for the same
γ, λa < λ.
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This implies that when there is deferred assimilation, we can expect a lower
steady-state λ, implying that in the long run, deferred assimilation by the immi-
grants leads to a lower workforce ratio, i.e. country D has a much lower workforce
than country F implying that the migrant-receiving country ends up with an even
larger workforce relative to that of the migrant-sending country.
2.4.4 Wages
The above analysis implies that when the migrants from country D choose to
delay assimilating into country F ’s culture, or adopt the foreign birth rate one
generation later, then at steady state, the domestic wage, wD is much lower than
the foreign wage wF . Hence, those who choose to stay in their home country’s
workforce end up with much relatively lower wages while both the immigrants and
natives end up with relatively higher wages.
For the migrant-receiving country, the effect is positive since its wages will
be relatively higher. This is a different result from what may be expected with
recent migration issues regarding assimilation. Assimilation issues are generally
perceived to be negative for the migrant-receiving country; however, what this
exercise essentially implies is that if country D’s wages are to hold, then it is both
the natives of country D and the migrants themselves that must adjust, i.e. they
should have a higher birth rate than in the case when assimilation occurs imme-
diately. Without any adjustment in their practices or if the birth rate of country
D holds, then this implies that those who stay in country D will have to bear the
consequences of the deferred assimilation, while the natives of country F , as well
as the migrants and the migrants’ offspring enjoy relatively higher wages. Thus,
contrary to what migrant-receiving countries may feel, any difficulties associated
with assimilating into the local culture allows them to face relatively higher wages
at the steady state.
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This simple result highlights that the assimilation of migrants into the migrant-
receiving country is a burden held by country D and, more importantly, by its
natives, and is not at all a burden held by country F .
2.4.5 Implications of Deferred Assimilation
This simple exercise of allowing for deferred assimilation in the model of homoge-
nous labor shows that, first, the gap in the size of the labor force between the
two countries is larger with deferred assimilation and, second, the wage gap is also
larger. What this implies is that the burden of the deferred assimilation falls on
the migrant-sending country and the proportion of the population that does not
choose to migrate. As for the migrant-receiving country, the result is favorable in
that their wages become relatively higher with deferred assimilation. This result
is different from what issues of assimilation may be expected to show, but this
highlights that the true burden of assimilation falls on the shoulders of the im-
migrants and those that were not able to migrate and stayed in their home country.
48
2.5 Conclusions
Under the model of homogenous labor, the main conclusion is that for any two
countries, if one country has higher wages than the other, then there will be a
proportion of the population in the migrant-sending country that will migrate to
the country with higher wages. Migration will display persistence as long as the
birth rate is higher in the migration-sending country. The role of scale effects in
the model with only type of labor is quite strong. The movement of people from
one country to another leads to the increase in the workforce and in the wage
gap. This is similar to the Reichlin-Rustichini (1998) model and, hence, rendering
persistent migration with one type of labor unfavorable for the migrant-sending
country as their wages will be relatively lower in the long run. The additional
analytical result in this study is the different dynamics of the workforce ratio and,
hence, the wage ratio, due to the endogeneity of the migration choice.
Another important result we have in addition to the results of Reichlin and
Rustichini (1998) is regarding the probability of migration. Given the wage dif-
ferential between the two countries, a higher level of a probability of migration
is better for the migrant-sending country. At steady-state, a higher probability
of migration implies that a lower proportion of newborn will consider migrating
as given a higher probability, the resulting workforce ratio is smaller, leading the
wage gap to be lower. This implies that the wage level in the migrant-sending
country will be relatively higher. For the migrant-receiving country, however, al-
lowing free migration will result in lower wages as compared to the case where
they limit migration. For a migration flow that is primarily of one type of labor,
it is then more favorable, in terms of wages, for the migrant-receiving country to
limit migration.
The analysis on wages due to endogenous choices in the model of Reichlin and
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Rustichini (1998) then adds another dimension to the overall analysis. When we
consider the probabilities of migration, if persistent migration is to occur then,
at steady-state, in terms of relative wages, it is more favorable for the migrant-
receiving country to limit migration while it is more favorable for the migrant-
sending country to prefer unlimited migration. While this is quite an obvious
result, that this is based on a dynamic model of general equilibrium and where
the migration choice is endogenous makes it a more interesting result.
When we then relax the assumption of immediate assimilation, we find that
the migrant-receiving country is better off when assimilation is deferred as they
face higher wages. When the adoption of the local birth rate occurs for second-
generation immigrants, then those that were not able to migrate face lower wages
and, thus, deferred assimilation becomes more a burden for the migrant-sending
country than for the migrant-receiving country.
However, all of the analysis are of course not without their limitations since
we are currently only looking at one type of labor. In the following chapter, we
then introduce two types of labor in the model as well as additional choice of skill
acquisition for an extended analysis on workforce ratios and wage ratios.
Chapter 3





While the previous chapter showed how persistent migration may be beneficial to
one country and not so beneficial to the other, current migration flows are char-
acterized by different skill levels in immigrants. Countries that are predominantly
a source of migrants are concerned with issues such as the loss of skilled workers
while those that are primarily a destination for migrants are concerned with how
the existence of low-skilled workers affects labor market outcomes. In this chapter,
we address this aspect of migration by identifying two types of labor: skilled and
unskilled.
It has been reported that 35 percent of all migrants from developing coun-
tries found in developed countries have a university degree, 30 percent grad-
uated from high school, and around 35 percent left school before finish high
school.(International Organization for Migration, 2008) It then becomes impor-
tant for migration of different types of labor to be analyzed as the migration of
skilled labor may have different characteristics to the migration of unskilled labor,
and that allowing both to occur may lead to more interesting results for persistent
migration.
Most migrant-receiving countries today have several programmes for the intake
of workers of different skill levels and they also differ in their approach. Coun-
tries such as Australia, Canada and the U.K. base their immigration decisions on
certain migrant characteristics including skills and qualifications, where as some
countries such as the U.S. and Canada base their decisions on available job offers.
This implies that successful migration can only occur with a given probability de-
pending on the skill level or qualifications of the migrants. Potential migrants who
are looking to work in the medical field may have a higher chance of migrating
to Canada or Australia, while those who are looking to work in construction have
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been welcomed more in the Middle East. This is something which we hope to
address in this paper.
Differences in skill level obtained by the immigrant community is one of the
characteristics of international migration. Thus, another dimension of persistent
migration that we would like to include in this study is the flow of skilled and
less-skilled workers into destination countries. A study by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2008 reports that in the
OECD area, the immigrant population holds a high share of both tertiary-educated
individuals and those that have low educational attainment of all foreign-born in-
dividuals, as compared to the native born. Figure C.1 shows the different levels
of education attained by the immigrants from the main countries of origin for the
U.S.1
This illustrates that defining skill levels across migrants is interesting to an-
alyze and to include in the model. From the perspective of the migrant-sending
country, the emigration of skilled workers is an issue which in the development
literature has been assessed to see if it is detrimental or not to the economy, nor-
mally referred to as “brain drain.”. Brain drain, according to Kwok and Leland
(1982), “is an expression of British origin commonly used to describe one of the
most sensitive areas in the transfer of technology. It refers to skilled profession-
als who leave their native lands in order to seek more promising opportunities
elswhere.” In the development literature, the focus has been on skilled workers
or highly-educated individuals leaving developing countries for developed coun-
tries (Lien and Wang, 2005; Beine, et.al. 2008). Bhagwati and Hamada (1974)
assess that brain drain may have negative effects welfare while Haque and Kim
(1995) show that it may decrease the growth of income per capita of the migrant-
sending country in the long run. Some studies also show how the emigration of
1The report by the OECD (2008) contains similar data on all OECD countries.
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skilled workers can be beneficial for the migrant-sending country such as those of
Miyagiwa (1991), Mountford (1997), Vidal (1998), Beine, et. al.(2001) and Fan
and Stark (2007) either through growth or some measure of the level of educated
workers left behind in the migrant-sending country. Although Beine, et.al. (2001)
argue this may be more of a “theoretical curiosity” given that the education deci-
sion is dependent upon the migration possibility. In this study, while we neither
assess the effect of migration on growth nor welfare, we are able to asses the level
of skilled workforce in the migrant-sending country relative to the level of unskilled
workers since we are able to study the ratios of the different workforces in the both
countries.
Another issue we consider is the existence of “overqualified” immigrants in
migrant-receiving countries. This issue may still be studied further in the migra-
tion literature as accounts of immigrants adopting employment of a lower skill
qualification do exist. Anecdotes of domestic helpers having acquired degrees in
their home countries, for example, exist in Canada and Singapore (Momsen, 2007).
Gonzalez (1997) reported that in the year 1997, 17 percent of domestic helpers
from the Philippines that were located in Singapore held a university degree and
around 45 percent spent at least some years in university even if they were not
able to complete their degree. Similar occurrences can be found in the Mexico-
U.S. migration flow where “trained teachers and nurses” accept employment as
maids due to the higher wages (Momsen, 2007). According to the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, around the year 2000, 25 percent,
17 percent and 19 percent of the foreign-born populations in Canada, U.S., and
Australia were holding a job for which they were overqualified.2 Hence, this issue
cannot be ignored and we include this scenario in our analysis by allowing mi-
grants who acquired education in their home countries to accept less-skilled jobs
2In the report, it is explained that they distinguish jobs as low, intermediate or high, in terms
of the level of qualification and “overqualified” is defined as having a job that is one level lower
to the potential level.
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in the host country.
In this chapter, where we discuss the model of heterogenous labor and the
effect of persistent migration on wages, three additional assumptions are made.
First, all newborn at each time period t are born unskilled for both countries. This
is different from Reichlin and Rustichini (1998) as they assume that there is an
intergenerational transfer of skill. Hence, we add another decision to be made at
the beginning of the time period, and that is before an individual decides to apply
for migration, they first decide whether they are going to acquire skill or not. This
is the key addition to the model. The next two additional assumptions are made
to simplify the model. One is that only individuals that are skilled can migrate.
This implies that even if unskilled labor wish to migrate to gain an unskilled job
in the migrant-receiving country, they would need to acquire skill first. Hence,
at the beginning of each time period, all newborn for both countries decide on
whether they would like to acquire skill or not and if they have opted to become
skilled workers, they then make a decision on whether to apply for migration or
not. And, the other is that all those who apply for migration face the possibility
of migrating as an unskilled worker, even if they get a higher wage.
We find that, in terms of the composition of labor, i.e. the skilled to unskilled
labor ratio, both the migrant-sending and the migrant-receiving countries benefit
from a higher probability of migration, either as a skilled migrant or as an un-
skilled migrant. This holds true even if migrants were allowed to migrate only
as skilled workers. For the migrant-receiving country, an expected result is that
their workforce composition is better the more immigrants acquire jobs as skilled
workers.
In terms of wages, we find that the unskilled to skilled wage gap is lower in
the migrant-sending country the higher the probability of migrating, whether as a
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skilled worker or an unskilled worker. For the migrant-receiving country, however,
a higher probability of skilled migration while limiting unskilled worker migration
makes their unskilled to skilled wage ratio improve. It is also interesting to note
that if the migrant-receiving country were to accept more migrants as unskilled
workers, then both countries experience wider wage gaps between their unskilled
and skilled workers, than if they accepted more skilled workers. And, a higher
probability of skilled worker migration is very beneficial to the migrant-sending
country as both their skilled and unskilled wages are closer to those of the migrant-
receiving country.
We introduce the model in Section 3.2, following a similar process of analysis as
to Chapter 2, including the role that the probabilities play in migration in Section
3.2.7. We then analyze the results for wage ratios in Section 3.3 and discuss our
conclusions in Section 3.4.
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3.2 Model with Heterogenous Labor
The model description and analysis that follows is only for the case where only
those who have acquired skilled can migrate. It may be argued that all migrants
have some form of education, regardless of the type of job they acquire upon
migrating and they have more chances of being allowed migrant status. We also
make an assumption on wages to restrict the flow of migration from one country to
another, which will be discussed in Section 3.2.2. To simplify notation, we follow
from the previous case of homogenous labor and label the sending country as ′D′,
the domestic country and the receiving country as ′F ′, the foreign country.
3.2.1 Technology with Two Types of Labor
Firms in each country face a similar technology to that of the case of homogenous
labor, but in this case, we let N be unskilled labor, and L be skilled labor for both
countries j = D,F .







where A = K¯η. Again, due to perfect competition, the returns to capital and













vjt = (1− α− β)(Kjt )α+η(pijt )β(N jt )−α (3.5)
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t is the skilled labor wage and v
j
t is the unskilled labor
wage.
3.2.2 Assumption on Wages
There are two patterns of migration which can be assessed. First, we consider the
flow of migration from country D to country F where immigrants become skilled
workers - Pattern 1. Second, we consider the possibility where migrants from
country D can become either a skilled worker or an unskilled worker in country
F - Pattern 2.
Pattern 1
For this pattern of migration, we make the following assumption on wages. For
both countries D and F , it must be that wjt > v
j
t where i, j = D,F , would then
hold as otherwise, there would be those who have acquired skill and would still
want to get hired for the unskilled job, as noted in Reichlin and Rustichini (1998).
Thus, all newborn individuals are unskilled and make a decision on whether to
acquire skill or not and this applies to both countries.
Our assumption on skilled wages and unskilled wages for both countries in







This automatically restricts the flow of migration from country D to country
F and that only those with skill from country D can apply for migration (i.e., un-
skilled workers from country D face a probability of migration of zero.) This rests
on the assumption that only those who have acquired skill can apply for migration.
In this pattern, there are two possibilities for the educated individuals in coun-
58
try D, apply for migration or stay and work at home.
Pattern 2
As in Pattern 1, we first assume that wjt > v
j
t . The difference is in v
F and wD.








Hence, for this pattern, those who apply for migration from country D now
face three possibilities. They may be accepted as a skilled migrant in country F ,
an unskilled migrant in country F or neither, and in which case the applicant will
work as a skilled worker in country D.
In the following two sections, we then discuss the household behavior for both






t , and Pattern








The OLG structure for the model with heterogenous labor is found below.
Figure 3.1: OLG Structure with Heterogenous Labor
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Pattern 1
Household Behavior in Country D
All newborn individuals a are endowed with cDa (the cost of migration) and
uDa (the cost of skill acquisition) and each is uniformly distributed on space[0,1].
The costs c and u are independent of each other. Each individual is then faced
with a decision of whether to acquire skill or not, and if skill is acquired, then
whether to apply for migration or not.
We focus on the case where [pwFt +(1−p)wDt ](1−cD)(1−uD) ≥ wDt (1−uD) ≥ vDt
where p is the exogenous probability of becoming a skilled migrant.
There are then three available options for the unskilled newborn in country D:
1. Stay unskilled when wDt (1− uD) < vDt
2. Acquire skill but not apply for migration when wDt (1−uD) ≥ vDt and [pwFt +
(1− p)wDt ](1− cD)(1− uD) < wDt (1− uD)
3. Acquire skill and apply for migration when wDt (1 − uD) ≥ vDt and [pwFt +
(1− p)wDt ](1− cD)(1− uD) ≥ wDt (1− uD)
Therefore, the domestic newborn population changes by σDt which is dependent
on the critical level of cost of skill acquisition uD∗t and by θt which is dependent on
the critical level of cost of applying for migration cD∗t , as in the case of homogenous
labor, which gives us the following expressions.
σDt = max{uD∗t , 0} (3.6)
θt = max{cD∗t , 0} (3.7)
(3.8)
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uD∗t = 1− vDt /wDt (3.9)
cD∗t =
p(wFt − wDt )
pwFt + (1− p)wDt
(3.10)
The variable σD is then the proportion of the newborn population that chooses
to acquire skill. Since it is assumed that vD < wD, it must be that σD ∈ (0, 1).
As in the model of homogenous labor, θt describes that proportion of the newborn
that fulfill the skill requirement and can migrate.
The workforce of country D at time period t is then made up of skilled labor
and unskilled labor. Skilled labor is composed of those who have acquired skill
and decided not to migrate as well as those who have acquired skill, have applied
for migration but were not accepted. And unskilled labor is simply the proportion
of the population that have chosen to remain unskilled, as expressed below.
LDt = [σ
D
t (1− pθt)]N¯Dt (3.11)
NDt = (1− σDt )N¯Dt (3.12)
Household Behavior in Country F
Similar to country D, all newborn individuals a are endowed with cFa and uFa
and each is uniformly distributed on space [0,1]. For country F , however, due to
our assumption on wages, there are only two available options for the newborn
unskilled individuals as no one will want to migrate, which are:
1. Stay unskilled when wFt (1− uF ) < vFt
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2. Acquire skill when wFt (1− uF ) ≥ vFt
A proportion of the foreign newborn population that acquires skill is then
σFt = max{uF∗t , 0} (3.13)
where
uF∗t = 1− vFt /wFt (3.14)
The workforce of country F at time period t is then composed of skilled labor
and unskilled labor, including those who have migrated from country D. Skilled
labor for country F is composed of those who have acquired skill and those who
were allowed to migrate from country D. Unskilled labor is then composed of










NFt = (1− σFt )N¯Ft (3.16)
Pattern 2
Household Behavior in Country D
The process in this pattern is exactly the same as that of Pattern 1, but with
the inclusion of a probability of migrating as unskilled, q.
We focus on the case where [pwFt + qv
F
t + (1 − p − q)wDt ](1 − cD)(1 − uD) ≥
wDt (1− uD) ≥ vDt where p is the exogenous probability of becoming a skilled mi-
grant and q is the exogenous probability of becoming an unskilled migrant.
As above, there are three available options for the unskilled newborn in country
D:
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1. Stay unskilled when wDt (1− uD) < vDt
2. Acquire skill but not apply for migration when wDt (1−uD) ≥ vDt and [pwFt +
qvFt + (1− p− q)wDt ](1− cD)(1− uD) < wDt (1− uD)
3. Acquire skill and apply for migration when wDt (1 − uD) ≥ vDt and [pwFt +
qvFt + (1− p− q)wDt ](1− cD)(1− uD) ≥ wDt (1− uD)
The newborn population of country D changes by σDt and by θt as in Pattern
1, which gives us the following expressions.
σDt = max{uD∗t , 0} (3.17)
θt = max{cD∗t , 0} (3.18)
(3.19)
where
uD∗t = 1− vDt /wDt (3.20)
cD∗t =
p(wFt − wDt ) + q(vFt − wFt )
[pwFt + qv
F
t + (1− p− q)wDt ]
(3.21)
In this case, σD is similar to the previous case, but θt is now dependent not
only on the level of skilled wages but also on the foreign unskilled wage since those
that acquire skill can also acquire an unskilled job upon migrating.
The workforce of country D at time period t is then made up of skilled labor
and unskilled labor, as expressed in Eqs. (3.15) and (3.16). Note that the skilled
labor of country D is different from Pattern 1 as there is the possibility of leaving
the domestic country as a skilled worker and migrating to work as an unskilled




t (1− pθt − qθt)]N¯Dt (3.22)
NDt = (1− σDt )N¯Dt (3.23)
Household Behavior in Country F
For country F , there are only two available options for the newborn unskilled
individuals as no one will want to migrate, which are:
1. Stay unskilled when wFt (1− uF ) < vFt
2. Acquire skill when wFt (1− uF ) ≥ vFt
The foreign newborn population then changes by
σFt = max{uF∗t , 0} (3.24)
where
uF∗t = 1− vFt /wFt (3.25)
Skilled and unskilled labor for country F are expressed below, noting that
the addition of the probability of migrating as an unskilled worker changes the










NFt = (1− σFt )N¯Ft + qθtσDt N¯Dt (3.27)
3.2.4 Equilibrium
Definition 2. A perfect foresight equilibrium for the world economy is a sequence







α+η−1 − δ (3.28)
wjt = (1− α)(N jt )η(kjt )α+η (3.29)
vjt = (1− α− β)Kα+ηpiβN−α (3.30)
θt = pt(w
F
t − wDt )/[ptwFt + (1− pt)wDt ] (3.31)
















We assume that total world savings in the current period is equal to total
capital stock in the next period, and also assume perfect capital mobility, as in
the model of homogenous labor.
3.2.5 Analysis and Results
From the given equations above, we can then solve for the relative wage structure
and the capital flows which follows from Reichlin-Rustichini (1998). For each time







































where ζ = β/1− α− η, γ = η/1− α− η and ρ = β/1− α− β.
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Similar to the case of homogenous labor, we analyze the behavior of the ra-




t . In this model, however, we include an
analysis of two additional variables: the workforce composition of country D,
piD = LDt /N
D







order to do this, we show that the mentioned ratios are topologically equivalent to
the ratio of newborn populations. This allows us to analyze the workforce ratios at
steady state as their properties would be the same as that of the ratio of newborn
populations.



















t then the discrete dynamical
systems of functions fi and gi, i = 1, 2, 3, are topologically equivalent.
Proof. From Eqs. (3.8),(3.9),(3.11),(3.12),(3.15),(3.16),(3.18),(3.19), it can be noted
that each workforce variable is a function of the newborn variable. Hence, any
ratio of these workforce variables is a function of a ratio of the newborn population
variables. And we can solve for λt = h1(φt), pi
D = h2(p¯i
D) and piF = h3(p¯i
F ) and
each mapping hi : R+ → R+, i = 1, 2, 3, is one-to-one, and continuous, and h1i is
continuous, i = 1, 2, 3, for all time periods t.
We then have the following equations that describe the evolution of the ratio
of unskilled workforces, the workforce compositions of country D and country F
for both patterns. It can be noted that when q = 0, then the equations are similar
for both patterns.
Pattern 1
Below is the system of equations that describe the steady state when wages have
this relation: wF > wD > vF > vD.
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λt =
(1− σDt )µ(piDt−1λt−1 + λt−1)














(1− σFt )(piFt−1 + 1)
(3.41)
where
σDt = 1− ρpiDt (3.42)

















And here we have the system of equations that describe the steady state when
wages have this relation: wF > vF > wD > vD
λt =
(1− σDt )µ(piDt−1λt−1 + λt−1)
(1− σFt )(piFt−1 + 1) + qθtσDt (piDt−1λt−1 + λt−1)
(3.46)
piDt =















σDt = 1− ρpiDt (3.49)






















Case: p ∈ (0, 1), q = 0
In this section, we explore results that may occur in the case where the migrant-
receiving country decides to receive only skilled migrants and sets q = 0, and









σF (piF + 1) + pθσDµ(piDλ+ λ)
(1− σF )(piF + 1) (3.55)
(3.56)
where
σD = 1− ρpiD (3.57)

















Eq. (3.60) confirms that at steady-state, when the migrant-receiving country
only prefers to receive skilled migrants with a probability p, that the ratio of
unskilled workers is essentially equal to the ratio of birth rates and the ratio of
the proportion of the total workforce that decides to stay unskilled. Thus, in the
scenario, the steady-state ratio of unskilled workers is unaffected by the proportion
of those that decide to migrate and the probability of migration.
3.2.6 Numerical Analysis at Steady State
In this section, we analyze the steady state properties of this system of equations
at steady state numerically. Based on the equilibrium conditions, the ratio of the
composition of labor between the two countries affects the skilled wage ratio with
an exponent of (ζ−1). This implies that if ζ were less than one, then an improve-
ment, for example, of the composition of labor in the migrant-sending country,
country D, relative to that of the migrant-receiving country, country F, may have
a negative effect on the relative skilled wage ratio3, which could go against our
assumption on relationship between the wages. Hence, we restrict ζ to be greater
than 1.
Since ζ = β
1−α−η , this implies that β is greater than (1−α−η) or that η is larger
than the relative share of unskilled labor N to output, or that the combined share
of physical capital K and skilled labor L is larger than that of unskilled labor.4
We choose to use the following parameters: α = 0.35; β = 0.45 and η = 0.25,
3This is also discussed in Reichlin and Rustichini (1998).
4Reichlin and Rustichini (1998) assess the possibility of ζ not being greater than one, and
explore the pattern of the flow of migration reversing. For this paper, we don’t consider this
possibility due to the differences in our model wherein we endogenize both the education and
migration choices.
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which give us γ = 0.625; ζ = 1.125 and ρ = 0.444. We choose these parameters
to be as close to typically used values for these parameters while still allowing for
the condition on ζ to hold.
The other important parameter choice is that of µ, the ratio of birth rates. For
this model, we also need µ > 1 for the migration to be sustained from country D
to country F .5
By choosing µ > 1, we are essentially exploring the migration pattern that
is apparent in the migration flows of migration corridors such as Mexico-U.S.,
Philippines-U.S., Bangladesh-India, India-US. While other migration corridors ex-
hibit a µ that is less than 1, we do not consider that possibility here due to the
equations in our model. We then use the average population growth rates of Mex-
ico and the United States from 1960 to 2009.6 This gives us a µ = 1.011, which is
similar to the case with homogenous labor.7
We discuss the results below of λ, the ratio of unskilled labor, pii, the ratio
of skilled-to-unskilled labor for each country i = D,F , as a function of both p
and q, the probabilities of migrating as skilled labor and unskilled labor, respec-
tively, noting that p + q ≤ 1 since there are only three possibilities: that they
are accepted as a skilled migrant with a probability p, accepted as an unskilled
migrant with a probability q or are not accepted as a migrant. Given a certain set
of parameters (i.e., γ, ζ, and ρ), we can then see the steady-state results for the
different workforce ratios dependent on the probabilities of migrating.
5We have conducted numerous exercises on the value of µ and find that the equations are
satisfied at steady-state only when µ > 1, though this cannot be verified analytically. This
condition is similar to the case of homogenous labor where the birth rate of the migrant-sending
country has to be greater than the birth rate of the migrant-receiving country.
6Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2010
7We also ran exercises using the ratio of birth rates between the Philippines and the United
States, as well as Bangladesh and India, but the results don’t differ significantly so we opt to
discuss the results from the Mexico-U.S. example.
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Pattern 1
We note that when the probability of migrating as an unskilled worker is zero,
or q = 0, and migrants are only allowed to migrate as skilled workers, the model
only works numerically for cases where p > 14%, indicating that extremely low
levels of probabilities of migration cannot sustain a persistent migration where our
assumption on wages holds.
Steady-state λ
From Figure C.2, we may note that steady-stateλ is increasing in p. This im-
plies that for any given probability of migrating as an unskilled worker, the foreign
country’s unskilled workforce will be relatively smaller as they receive more skilled
workers as migrants. This then leads to an increase in steady-state λ.
In this case, as discussed previously, steady-state λ is not affected by the pro-
portion that decides to migrate but only by the proportion that decides to acquire
education.
Steady-state piD
We can observe from Figure C.3 that as the probability of migrating as a
skilled worker increases, piD then increases. This implies that there are now rel-
atively more of the unskilled newborn that choose to go to school, and relatively
fewer of those that actually get to migrate and, thus, the domestic country is left
with relatively more skilled workers than unskilled workers as the probability of
migrating as a skilled worker increases..
Steady-state piF
Figure C.4 illustrates that steady-state piF is increasing in p. This implies that
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as the probability of migrating as a skilled worker increases, then there will be
relatively more skilled workers in country F , and thus have a higher skilled to
unskilled workforce ratio.
Pattern 2
Pattern 2 works only for certain probabilities of migration; mostly when p is close
to zero and q > 0. Thus, the model works only if the probability of migrating as
a skilled worker is almost zero and the probability of migrating as an unskilled
worker is high enough. We base this on the assumption on the relationship among
the wages. For our assumption on wages to hold, we only focus on these proba-
bilities given our chosen parameters.
The sets of probabilities we can assess are the following: 1) p = 0, q ∈ (0, 1],
2) p = 0.02, q ∈ (0, 0.72), 3) p = 0.04, q ∈ (0, 0.34), 4) p = 0.06, q ∈ (0, 0.20), 5)
p = 0.08, q ∈ (0, 0.12), and 6) p = 0.10, q ∈ (0, 0.06)
In the graphs found in the appendix, we show how the steady-state variables
respond to changes in the probability of migrating as unskilled worker given cer-
tain probabilities of p, selected from the values above.
Steady-state λ
Compared to Pattern 1, λ is very low. However, the unskilled workforce ratio
between country D and F is still increasing in the probability of migrating as an
unskilled worker, as shown in Figure C.5. This implies that while there is some
incentive to acquire skill and then invest in education due to probability of mi-
grating as an unskilled worker, there is a much lower proportion that do, leaving
country D with relatively more unskilled workers than country F , even if they are
receiving significantly more unskilled migrants.
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Steady-state piD
From Figure C.6, piD is increasing in q which implies that there are still rel-
atively more of newborn population that opt to stay unskilled as probabilities of
migration are quite low.
Steady-state piF
As for piF , it is decreasing in q as in Figure C.7 as there are relatively more
unskilled migrants and they are thus increasing their unskilled workforce.
3.2.7 The Role of the Probability of Migration
To focus the discussion, we can assess the size and composition ratios given Pat-
terns 1 and 2. With Pattern 1, we have q = 0 and p ∈ (0, 1], specifically for
p > 0.14, and with Pattern 2, we have p close to zero and q > 0, but with the
upper limit dependent on the given p. We can compare different scenarios for the
workforce ratios under these scenarios.
Table 3.1: The Role of Probabilities under Heterogenous Labor
Pattern 1: q = 0, p > 0
p = 0.20 p = 0.40 p = 0.60 p = 0.80 p = 1
λ 0.62431 0.89760 0.95481 0.97515 0.98461
piD 1.07643 1.07712 1.07724 1.07728 1.07730
piF 1.08421 1.08490 1.08502 1.08506 1.08508
Pattern 2: p = 0, q > 0
q = 0.20 q = 0.40 q = 0.60 q = 0.80 q = 1
λ 0.16277 0.26214 0.28724 0.29655 0.30093
piD 1.07451 1.07503 1.07515 1.07519 1.07521
piF 1.08003 1.07945 1.07932 1.07927 1.07925
In the table above, we have the results on the steady-state variables of work-
force ratios given different probabilities of migration. The more interesting vari-
ables are those of piD and piF as these reflect the composition of the labor force
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in both countries. The study of λ add to this analysis since it is indicative of the
size of the unskilled workforce in both countries.
In understanding the composition of labor in both countries, we adopt the use
of the term of Reichlin and Rustichini (1998) that the higher the ratio of skilled-
to-unskilled labor for either country, the composition improves or is “better.” This
is true in the sense that the economy’s workforce is made up of relatively more
skilled workers than unskilled workers. From the values above, a few observations
may be made. First, both piD and piF are higher in every case of p > 0, q = 0, than
q > 0, p = 0. This indicates that for both the migrant-receiving country as well
as the migrant sending country, the composition of the workforce (i.e., the ratio
of skilled to unskilled workers) is higher when the probability of migrating as a
skilled worker is higher than if the probability of migrating as an unskilled worker
is higher. This shows that when we allow for endogenous skill acquisition, that the
higher the possibility of migrating as a skilled worker encourages education and
that the concept of “brain drain” does not occur in this model8. Second, it can be
noted that for the case where p > 0, piD and piF become higher as p approaches
1. This again indicates the inclusion of endogenous skill choice as both countries
end up with a higher composition of labor the higher the chance to migrate. For
the migrant-receiving country, this implies that they end up with a higher labor
composition, when there is no limit imposed on skilled worker immigration. Third,
when the migrant-receiving country is accepting only unskilled workers, then piF is
better as q approaches zero. This is quite intuitive as the more unskilled workers
country F accepts, the lower the composition of its workforce becomes. In terms
8For this analysis, we do not make inferences to growth or welfare, rather we are just stating
that “brain drain,” as defined in 3.1, does not necessarily occur in the sense that there is
no depletion of skilled workers, given that the migrant-sending country faces a higher skilled-
to-unskilled workforce ratio the higher the probability of migrating as a skilled worker. This
reiterates the statement of Fan and Stark (2007) that most theoretical analyses that find that
the emigration of highly skilled workers may result in the sending country having a higher level
of educated workers is due to the endogeneity of the education choice being dependent on the
possibility of migration.
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of comparing the size of the unskilled workforce, another glaring result is that λ
is much lower when q > 0 than when p > 0. Thus, the size of the unskilled labor
force is relatively larger for country F when it is accepting more unskilled workers
than skilled workers.
What this exercise shows us is that the modifications made on the Reichlin-
Rustichini model do allow us to gain more insightful results. The endogeneity of
skill acquisition as well as the inclusion of probabilities of migration allow us to see
how the effects of the size and the composition of labor are affected in persistent
migration given different scenarios. The basic result that the composition of labor
in both countries is greater than 1, i.e., there is more skilled labor than unskilled
labor, for all cases shows us that when migration is characterized by endogenous
skill acquisition, that both countries can end up with an improved composition of
labor.
3.2.8 Robustness Checks
The results in graphical form for the robustness checks for Pattern 1 are in the
Appendix, labeled Figures C.8-C.19 while the results for the robustness checks for
Pattern 2 are in the Appendix, labeled Figures C.20-C.31.
In Table 3.2.8, we show the variations in the parameters applied. All the vari-
ables seem to behave well even with slight variations in some parameters. The
only slight differences occur when either p or q are very close to zero, an indication
that the model may be sensitive when there is virtually no possibility of migration
which is not covered by this model of persistent migration.
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Table 3.2: Robustness Checks for Heterogenous Labor Model




β = 0.45, η = 0.25, γ = 0.641, ζ = 1.154,ρ = 0.422, µ = 1.011
Check 1b
α = 0.34
β = 0.45, η = 0.25, γ = 0.610, ζ = 1.098,ρ = 0.467, µ = 1.011
Check 2a
β = 0.46
α = 0.35, η = 0.25, γ = 0.625, ζ = 1.150,ρ = 0.413, µ = 1.011
Check 2b
β = 0.44
α = 0.35, η = 0.25, γ = 0.625, ζ = 1.100,ρ = 0.477, µ = 1.011
Check 3a
η = 0.26
α = 0.35, η = 0.45, γ = 0.667, ζ = 1.154,ρ = 0.444, µ = 1.011
Check 3b
η = 0.24
α = 0.35, β = 0.4b5, γ = 0.5855, ζ = 1.098,ρ = 0.444, µ = 1.011
Check 4a
µ = 1.014
α = 0.35,β = 0.45, η = 0.25, γ = 0.641, ζ = 1.154,ρ = 0.422
Check 4b
µ = 1.008
α = 0.35, β = 0.45, η = 0.25, γ = 0.610, ζ = 1.098,ρ = 0.467
3.3 Movement of Wages with Heterogenous La-
bor
Numerous studies on migration have looked at labor market outcomes, specifically
on wages as this is of utmost concern for both the migrant-sending country as well
as the migrant-receiving country, especially for the latter. This aspect of migra-
tion literature aims to study the effect of immigration on the distribution of wages,
i.e. the differences in wages for skilled and unskilled workers, whether native- or
foreign-born. Most studies that have looked at how immigration affects the wages
of the less-skilled natives have found that the effect is negative (Johnson (1980),
Altonji and Card (1991), De New and Zimmerman (1994), Orrenius and Zavodny
(2007), Ottaviano and Peri (2006)). As for the effect of an influx of immigrants
on skilled natives, it is less clear. Johnson (1980) and De New and Zimmerman
(1994) find that skilled natives’ wages increase due to immigration, while Borjas
(2005) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006) find that wages are lower. Orrenius and
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Zavodny (2007) find no significant effects on skilled natives’ wages.
One aspect of migration that is often overlooked in research is the effect of mi-
gration on the sending country’s labor market outcomes. As most of the studies
done on the sending country have involved the issue of brain drain, relatively fewer
studies exist that look at how emigration affects the sending country’s wages and
employment opportunities. Mishra (2007) claims to be the only study to be done
on Mexico and finds that emigration leads to skilled wages to increase.
When we allow for heterogeneity in labor, and endogenize skill acquisition, we
assess how wages differ given different probabilities of migration for unskilled and
skilled labor. Our contributions lie in the aspects of current migration research
that are lacking: the effect of emigration on the source country’s wages as well as
the effect of migration on both skilled and unskilled wages for both the migrant-
sending and migrant-receiving countries.
We find the growth rates of the workforces and, consequently, the growth rates
of wages. In this model, there are two types of labor: skilled and unskilled, and
there are two types of wages: skilled and unskilled. We first calculate the growth
rates for the labor of country D.
3.3.1 Analysis and Results
Since the unskilled workforce of country D at time period t is given by NDt =
(1− σDt )(1 + nD)[LDt−1 +NDt−1], its growth rate is given by
gND = (1− θDt )(1 + nD)(1 + piDt−1)− 1. (3.61)
Hence, the growth of the remaining unskilled workforce is determined by those
77
who decide not to invest in education and the natural birth rate.
The skilled workforce of country D is given by LDt = θ
D
t (1 − pθt − qθt)(1 +
nD)[LDt−1 +N
D
t−1] and we can calculate its growth rate as shown below.
gLD = σ
D




This implies that the growth rate of skilled labor in country D is dependent
on the birth rate, the proportion of the newborn that invests in education and the
proportion of those who apply for migration but do not get accepted as a skilled
nor as an unskilled migrant.
For country F , unskilled labor at time period t is given by NFt = (1− σFt )(1 +
nF )[LF t− 1+NFt−1]+qθtσDt (1+nD)[NDt−1+LDt−1]. Since the workforce in country F
is also affected by the proportion of migrants coming from countryD, the equations
are slightly more complex. The growth rate of unskilled labor in country F is then
calculated as shown below.
gNF = (1− σFt )(1 + nD)(1 + piFt−1) + qθσDt (1 + nD)(λt−1(1 + piDt−1))− 1 (3.63)
This equation indicates that country F ’s unskilled workforce growth is depen-
dent on two important terms. The leftmost term would be its growth rate without
migration and it would only, therefore, be affected by its own birth rate and the
proportion of the population that do not go to school. Since a migration process
occurs, then its growth rate is also affected by what occurs in country D and is
dependent on country D’s birth rate, the proportion of newborn that decide to
acquire skill and the proportion of those that get accepted as unskilled migrants











t−1]. This allows us to find
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its growth rate as
gLF = σ
F









Similarly, this equation shows us how the proportion of migrants accepted as
skilled workers also affects the growth rate of country F and if were not accepting
any migrants, then its skilled labor’s growth rate would only be a function of the
proportion of its own newborn that decide to acquire education.
Since the unskilled wage of countryD is vDt = (1−α−β)(KDt )α+η(LDt )β(NDt )−α−β
we can then find the following equation to express its growth rate in time period
t.








gND = [(1− θDt )(1 + nD)(1 + piDt−1)− 1] (3.67)






which gives us the following growth rate.









gND = [(1− θDt )(1 + nD)(1 + piDt−1)− 1] (3.70)
For country F , the unskilled wage is vFt = (1−α−β)(KFt )α+η(LFt )β(NFt )−α−β
and its growth rate can be calculated as shown below.













gNF = (1− σFt )(1 + nD)(1 + piFt−1)
+qθσDt (1 + n
D)(λt−(1 + piDt−1))− 1 (3.73)




















gNF = (1− σFt )(1 + nD)(1 + piFt−1) +
qθσDt (1 + n
D)(λt−(1 + piDt−1))− 1 (3.76)
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3.3.2 Numerical Analysis
For Pattern 1, we refer to the C.32-C.35 in the Appendix and for Pattern 2, we
refer to Figures C.36-C.39. In both patterns, we again highlight the role that
probabilities of migration play in this model of persistent migration.
Table 3.3: The Role of Probabilities in Relative Wages with Heterogenous Labor
Pattern 1: q = 0, p > 0
p = 0.20 p = 0.40 p = 0.60 p = 0.80 p = 1
vD
wD
0.47837 0.47867 0.47872 0.47874 0.47875
vF
wF
0.48182 0.48213 0.48218 0.48220 0.48221
vD
vF
0.73894 0.92717 0.96367 0.97646 0.98236
wD
wF
0.74428 0.93387 0.97064 0.98351 0.98946
Pattern 2: p = 0, q > 0
q = 0.20 q = 0.40 q = 0.60 q = 0.80 q = 1
vD
wD
0.47751 0.47774 0.47780 0.47782 0.47782
vF
wF
0.47996 0.47971 0.47965 0.47963 0.47962
vD
vF
0.31969 0.43111 0.45658 0.46581 0.47013
wD
wF
0.32133 0.43288 0.45835 0.46758 0.47189
For Pattern 1, what we find is that all the relevant wage ratios, vD/wD, vF/wF ,
vD/vF , and wD/wF are all increasing in the probability of migrating as a skilled
worker. This can be noted in Table 3.3.2 as well as in the Figures in the Appendix.
For Pattern 2, we find that vD/wD, vD/vF , and wD/wF all increase with the prob-
ability of migrating as an unskilled worker. However, vF/wF , the unskilled wage
to skilled wage ratio decreases as q increases. This implies that the wage gap, or
wage inequality, between unskilled workers and skilled workers increases as the
migrant-receiving country opts to receive more unskilled labor.
From Table 3.3.2, it can be observed that in either case where p > 0 or q > 0,
the unskilled to skilled wage ratio for both countries D and F is just below 0.5,
implying that the unskilled wage is just half of the skilled wage. Although in
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Section 3.2.7, we saw that there is an improvement in the composition of labor
for both patterns of migration, when wages are observed, we find that the wage
gap within each country widens with migration. However, it may be noted that
this inequality decreases the higher the probability of migration, whether as an
unskilled or as a skilled worker.
It is also worth noting that when we are comparing domestic to foreign wages,
the case of skilled worker migration (i.e. Pattern 1), results in more favorable
scenarios for the wage ratios when comparing the wages of country D to those
of county F . The skilled wage and unskilled wage ratios between country D and
country F are closer to 1. This implies that a high probability for skilled worker
migration leads to a decrease in the gaps of both the skilled wage and unskilled
wage between both countries.
In addition to this, one result for Pattern 2 shows that the wage differences
between country D and country F are much wider. In fact, when q is low (in this




From this study of analyzing a model of persistent migration, we find that en-
dogenizing the migration choice in both the homogenous and heterogenous labor
models, that endogenizing the skill acquisition choice in the heterogenous labor
model, and that introducing a probability of migration that may serve as a quota,
changes the characteristics of persistent migration and our results differ from those
originally found by Reichlin and Rustichini (1998).
In this model of heterogenous labor, we are able to analyze the composition
of labor from a different perspective. Since there exists this aspect of endogenous
skill acquisition and, again, the probability of migration, we gain more insights
regarding the differences between skilled labor and unskilled labor in each coun-
try. In this case, again we find that probabilities of migration have an important
role. First, we can identify two patterns for persistent migration. One is when
skilled labor from the migrant-sending country migrate only as skilled migrants in
the migrant-receiving country. Second is when the skilled labor from the migrant-
sending country migrate as unskilled workers with a higher probability or as skilled
workers with a lower probability.
From the numerical analysis conducted, an important result is that both coun-
tries develop higher compositions of labor the higher the probability of migration,
whether as skilled or unskilled. A higher composition of labor means a higher
skilled workforce relative to the unskilled workforce. This implies that, because
only skilled labor are allowed to migrate, the increase in the probabilities of migra-
tion results in a larger incentive to invest in education. For the migrant-sending
country, this implies that applying stricter rules on the education of its migrants or
increasing the standards for potential migrants may be important for emigration
policy. For the migrant-receiving country, if such a policy is in place in the country
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where their immigrants are from, then increasing the probability of migrating, as a
skilled or an unskilled worker, also results in a higher labor composition. Another
result is that if the migrant-receiving country does intend to receive either skilled
or unskilled migrants, it achieves a higher skilled-to-unskilled workforce ratio when
it chooses to receive only skilled migrants than unskilled migrants.
For the model of heterogenous labor, given our chosen parameters, we find that
for both countries, that the unskilled wage is approximately half the skilled wage,
and are closer to each other as the probability of migrating as an unskilled worker
or as a skilled worker increases. This is true except for the unskilled to skilled
wage ratio of the migrant-receiving country, and in this sense, skilled migration
as a pattern becomes more favorable. However, if the migrant-receiving country
would like to maintain relatively higher wages than the migrant-sending country,
then unskilled migration is more favorable as the wage ratios are smaller, or the
wage gaps are larger.
For the migrant-sending country, skilled migration allows both the skilled wage
and the unskilled wage to approach those of the migrant-receiving country. Al-
though, due to persistent migration, the wages will not equalize, the wage gap is
smaller with the pattern of migration where migrants gain skilled employment.
Chapter 4




One of the main observations of modern migrations flows is the formation of mi-
grant networks in migrant-receiving countries. Clustering has been noted as a
characteristic of migration where a specific location may attract a growing group
of immigrants and, in addition, these immigrants also emigrate from similar areas
of their home countries. Mexican migrants, for example, have been found to group
themselves in the states of California, Texas, Florida and Chicago. While this is
indicative of the formation of networks in the destination country, another inter-
esting aspect of research in this area of migrant networks points to the observation
that migrants in the same area also come from the same area. For example, 58
percent of migrants coming from Guanajuato in Mexico find themselves located
in California. (Bauer, et. al. 2002) For the most part, existing networks, whether
family networks or community networks, may primarily provide potential migrants
with information on migrating, information on available jobs and, in some cases,
a source of credit. (Dolfin and Genicot, 2006)
Hence, we also explore the effect that existing migrant networks may have on
persistent migration. Work done by Carrington, et. al. (1996) has proposed that
the presence of networks has a decreasing effect on the cost of migrating, while
Munshi (2003) showed that a Mexican migrant to the US is more likely to be em-
ployed and to get a non-agricultural job, compared to another without an already
existing network.
These networks may also allow immigrants to partake in entrepreneurial activ-
ities, have access to financial capital and have more work opportunities through
referrals. Munshi (2003), in his study on Mexican immigrants in the U.S., for
instance, found that networks determine both the magnitude of migration flows
and the employment of future migrants. Frijters, et.al. (2005) have found that
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networks account for job success among immigrant groups in the United Kingdom.
Though difficult to measure, and primarily an issue for the migrant-receiving
country, migrant networks have recently received more attention in research as
they have been seen to allow immigrants to integrate themselves with relative
ease, which is seen as a decrease in the cost of migration. Whether formal or in-
formal, migrant organizations provide services in order for immigrants to be able
to do things such as learn the local language, take training courses, and familiarize
themselves with the local community.
Most of the other research done in this area has also been empirical in their
approach. Goel and Lang (2009), for example, analyzes immigration in Canada
using a theoretical model that shows that the larger the difference between the
strength of the network and the strength of formal sources in finding employ-
ment, the smaller the wage differential between the formal and informal networks
themselves. The study also shows that networks contribute to the assimilation of
immigrants in the sense that network strength induces a faster arrival rate of jobs.
A study looking at 27 OECD countries by Pedersen, et.al. (2004) also highlighted
network effects in European countries as they have not been focused on as much as
North America. One of their key results is that network effects, which is measured
by the coefficient of the stock of migrants of the same nationality, has a large and
positive effect on the inflow of migrant workers in OECD countries from 1990 to
2000. Along with this, other factors such as language, colonial history and busi-
ness ties also have an impact on migrant flows. Bauer, et. al. (2002) also focused
on the Mexico-U.S. migration corridor and try to differentiate network effects from
herd effects, implying that it is herd behavior and not network effects that have
a stronger positive influence on the migration decision. The study concludes that
this difference is not very clear but both do have significant effects on the location
87
of the immigrant.1
Munshi (2003) has a discussion on how networks emerge in the process of labor
migration. He states that positive unemployment is a necessary condition for the
existence of networks. However, other causes have to justify their continued exis-
tence such as the savings on the cost of migration on the part of the individual,
and also incomplete information on the ability of potential employees on the part
of the firm. The latter prompts the firm to enlist the help of its existing work-
ers which could then make his network valuable. He also discusses that it is the
“older” migrants that have a higher propensity to help new immigrants and, as
such, contribute more to the network. By looking at data from the Mexico-U.S.
migration corridor, he is able to verify that if the network is larger, an individual is
more likely to find a job and to hold a preferred non-agricultural job and find that
it is the presence of the more established members of the network who contribute
the most and that it is the disadvantaged members (i.e. women or elderly) that
benefit the most. Dolfin and Genicot (2006) add to this by stating three ways in
which a network has positive migration effects: (1) the provision of information,
(2) the ease of assimilation, and (3) potential source of credit. Their study, which
distinguishes between family and community networks, verifies that networks do
have strong positive effects on the migration decision.
Mackenzie and Rapaport (2007) look at the effect of these formed networks
on income inequality in the home country, through the premise that the formed
networks lower the cost of migration and, hence, might improve inequality in the
source economy. They find that at very high levels of migration due to the pres-
ence of large networks, the benefits of migration spread to the those in the lower
income brackets in the source economy as the cost of migration is lower while the
reverse is also true, i.e. smaller networks benefit those with higher incomes in the
1See Epstein (2002) for more discussion on herd behavior, along with informational cascades.
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home economy.
Carrington, et. al. (1996) use the presence of networks in determining migra-
tion flows in a dynamic setting which attempt to explain the Great Migration from
the South to the North in the U.S. The presence of networks essentially decreases
the cost of migration and this model better explains increasing migration flows
than models that assume fixed or decreasing costs of migration.2
The main objective of this chapter is then to assess how migrant networks
affect persistent migration. Network effects is an area that has also garnered re-
search attention over the years. It banks on the concepts brought forth by research
on the network effects on the labor-market in a local economy such as those from
Montgomery (1991; 1992). And also uses theories and ideas put forth by social
networks and ethnicity such as that of Borjas (1995). The main idea from labor
economics is that work referrals through friends or relatives contributes to the
resulting workforce. It is understood that referrals through networks is not only
less costly but can also result into a higher probability of generating a job offer.
Hence, individuals who are well-connected tend to fare better from this informal
process than those who are not and, also, firms who hire through this process
could earn higher profits.
In Section 3.2, we introduce network effects into the model of homogenous
labor, as presented in Chapter 2 and show how network effects may occur through
a higher probability of migration. In Section 3.3, we show our analysis and results
and conclude in Section 3.4.
2See Sjaastad (1962). They also test this idea empirically on the incomes of African-American




In this section, we introduce the effect that existing migrant networks have on
the patterns of migration. Some migrant-receiving countries have implemented
programs of family reunification for migrant workers, and this has made the mi-
gration process easier for some applicants. The migration process also becomes
less expensive as the existence of networks enables individuals to settle in their
foreign environments more efficiently, including finding accommodation as well
as acquiring employment. In the job search literature, it has been shown that
networks do increase the probability of finding a job due to the increase in job
referrals (Montgomery, 1991; 1992).
We can, thus, identify one way in which networks may affect migration, where
an existing migrant network may increase the probability of migration. The in-
crease of the probability of migration due to the presence of network effects may
be interpreted as the ease at which a potential migrant is able to cross the border,
find a job in the host country, and also settle in the new environment. It may also
be interpreted as the ease of applying for migration with the migration applicant
facing a better chance of being granted an immigrant visa to the country of their
choice. This may represent programs such as family reunification where people
who have families in the destination country find it easier to migrate or are given
a higher chance to migrate by the host country itself. In the United States, for
example, family reunification was found the the largest avenue for potential mi-
grants to gain residence.3 Hence, family ties may be a source for increasing the
probability of migration.
3Source: Migration Information Source, 2003,
http://www.migrationinformation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?id=122#1, Retrieved 2011.
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4.2.1 Increasing Probability Due to Networks
The assumption in this case is that an increase in the proportion of migrants in
the previous period makes it easier for an individual applying for migration to be
accepted by the migrant-receiving country so we assume that the probability of
migration is increasing in the previous period’s proportion of migrants. Hence,
the probability of migration becomes endogenous and is determined by the initial
probability of migration and a term which is increasing in the proportion of those
who apply for migration in the previous period.
pt = p(θt−1) (4.1)
where p : (0, 1)→ (0, 1) is twice continuously differentiable and where p′(·) > 0.
Hence, the proportion of migrants at time period t is
θt =
p(θt−1)(1− λγt )
p(θt−1) + (1− p(θt−1))λγt
(4.2)
4.2.2 Analysis and Results
Lemma 6. Let pt ∈ (0, 1) and if pt = p(θt−1) where p : (0, 1) → (0, 1) is twice
continuously differentiable and where p′(·) > 0, we have (θt)n > θ.
Proof. Let (θt)n be the proportion of those that intend to migrate when there are
network effects. When pt ∈ (0, 1), θt = pt(1−λ
γ
t )






(pt + (1− pt)λγt )2
(4.3)
Since λ ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 0, we have λγt ∈ (0, 1) and ∂θt∂pt > 0.
91
Therefore, with network effects, (θt)n > θt.
Hence, when the network effect takes place, the result is a higher proportion
of migrants θt when there is an increase in the previous period’s θ, or (θt)n > θt
where the subscript n stands for network effects. A higher proportion that applies
for or intends to migrate in the previous period leads to a higher probability of
migration in the current period, leading to a higher proportion of potential mi-
grants in the current period, showing how existing networks formed by immigrant
from the previous period can encourage more migration.
Proposition 8. If there is an increase in θt−1, then λt will decrease.




We can calculate, via Implicit Function Theorem,
∂λt
∂θt
= − pt + (1− pt)λ
γ
t




< 0 and a higher θt due to network effects leads to a lower λt or a
lower workforce ratio between countries D and F .
This implies that when network effects take place, and a higher probability of
migration occurs in the next period, then there will be a higher proportion intend-
ing to migrate, which leads to a lower workforce ratio in the next period, i.e. the
domestic workforce will be smaller while the foreign workforce will be larger. From
this, it should then be noted that the wage differential is larger with network ef-
fects. The migrant-receiving country thus enjoys relatively higher wages over time
when network effects take place while the migrant-sending country experiences
relatively lower wages. This may then be interesting to note for migrant-receiving
countries. The increase of immigrants due to the formation of networks may be
of an issue in certain societies; however, in this simple case, the host country ends
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up facing relatively higher wages over time and network effects for their country
tends to be positive.
We also assess the new system of equations under steady state.
Lemma 7. Let p = p(θ) where p′(θ) > 0, then if θp′(θ) + p(theta) + (1− p)λγ >
p′(θ)[θλγ + (1− λγ)], then ∂θ
∂p
> 0.
Proof. At steady state, Eq.(4.2) becomes
θ =
p(θ)(1− λγ)
p(θ) + (1− p(θ))λγ (4.5)
where p(θ) is the function of the probability of migration where p′(θ) > 0.





= − (θ − 1)(1− λ
γ)
θp′(θ) + p(θ) + (1− p(θ))λγ − p′(θ)(θλγ + (1− λγ)) (4.6)
Since (θ−1) < 0, the term ∂θ
∂p
< 0 or > 0 depending on θp′(θ)+p(θ)+(1−p)λγ
and p′(θ)(θλγ + (1− λγ)). Since, by assumption, p′(θ) > 0, then if θp′(θ) + p(θ) +
(1− p)λγ > p′(θ)(θλγ + (1− λγ)), then ∂θ
∂p
> 0.
Therefore, analytically, at steady state, the effect of an increasing probability
function on the steady-state proportion of the newborn population that applies for
migration is ambiguous. It is dependent on the steady-state probability as well as
the steady-state proportion of potential migrants and the steady-state workforce
ratio. Given this, we may observe a result for the steady-state workforce ratio.






Proof. At steady state, we have λ = (1−p(θ)θ)µ−1
p(θ)θµ
. We can find ∂λ
∂p







)(µ(2θ − 1)− 1)
(pθµ)2
(4.7)
Thus, if, by assumption, µ(2θ − 1) > 1), if ∂θ
∂p
> 0, then we have ∂λ
∂p
> 0.
The above result explains that there are two possible scenarios for the work-
force ratio, and this also implies that there are two possible scenarios for the wage
ratio, depending on what happens to the steady-state proportion of migrants if the
probability of migration is endogenous and is increasing in the proportion of po-
tential migrants. Hence, if network effects take place, and if the result is a higher
steady-state proportion of migration applicants, then the steady-state workforce
ratio is higher, and the wage ratio is higher, which implies that the wage in the
migrant-sending country is closer to that of the migrant-receiving country. How-
ever, it is still possible that at steady-state, the workforce ratio and the wage ratio
are lower than when network effects do not take place, and the migrant-sending
country is left with a much lower wage compared to that of the migrant-receiving
country. Therefore, at steady-state, the existence of network effects may bode well
either for the home country or the host country, depending on the effect of the
increasing probability of migration on the steady-state proportion of the newborn
population that applies for migration.
4.2.3 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we provide a numerical simulation by specifying the functional
form of the probability of migration as an example. We assess the change in the
workforce ratio over time when network effects take place, and we also assess the
effect on the steady-state workforce ratio and the steady-state wage ratio with
network effects.
In the Appendix, Figure D.1 shows us how the workforce ratio changes over
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several time periods given different probabilities. We use the same parameters
used in Chapter 2 where µ = 1.011 and γ = 0.4. We set the initial workforce
ratio at λ0 = 0.90. And, from the analysis in Chapter 2, we note that given these
parameters, there is divergence from the steady-state, and the workforce ratio de-
creases over time, as the workforce of the migrant-sending country, Country D
decreases and the workforce of the migrant-sending country, Country F increases
as persistent migration occurs. We assess three cases: (1) where the initial prob-
ability of migration is set at p = 0.40, (2) where the probability of migration is
increasing in the proportion of potential migrants from the last period at an in-
creasing rate, pt = 0.40 + θ
2
t−1, and (3) another case with a different exponent,
where pt = 0.40 + θ
0.80
t−1 ., where the additive term is increasing in the previous
period’s proportion of potential migrants at a decreasing rate.
From the figure, it can be noted that the decrease in the workforce ratio over
time is faster in both cases where the probability of migration is increasing in
the proportion of migrants in the last period, with the decrease occurring faster
when the exponent is 0.80 than when it is 2. This basically implies that with
the probability of migration increasing in the previous period’s proportion of po-
tential migrants, more migration occurs and migration becomes more persistent.
This also implies that the wage ratio decreases faster over time as network effects
take place. Thus, with more generations participating in persistent migration,
over time, the migrant-sending country faces a relatively lower wage than the
migrant-receiving country. The migrant-receiving country, over time, experiences
relatively higher wages due to network effects.
At steady-state, we analyze the effect of network formation on the workforce
ratio. Below is Table 4.1 where we find the steady-state values of λ and θ given
an initial probability of either p = 0.50 or p = 0.80 and with p increasing in
steady-state θ with an exponent taking on different values. From the numerical
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examples below, it can be noted that if the exponent were less than one, that the
steady-state values for the workforce ratio, λ, are higher. If the exponent were
more than one, then λ is lower.
Table 4.1: Steady-State Variables with Network Effects
Probability of Migration Workforce Ratio Proportion of Potential Migrants
p λ θ
p = 0.50 0.9456 .0112
p = 0.50 + θ0.2 0.9816 0.064
p = 0.50 + θ0.8 0.9499 0.0106
p = 0.50 + θ1.4 0.9448 0.0111
p = 0.50 + θ2 0.9444 0.0112
p = 0.80 0.9787 .0069
p = 0.80 + θ0.2 0.9895 0.048
p = 0.80 + θ0.8 0.9795 0.0067
p = 0.80 + θ1.4 0.9786 0.0069
p = 0.80 + θ2 0.9785 0.0069
The numerical example above shows that if the probability of migration was
increasing in the previous period’s proportion of migrants at an increasing rate,
that the resulting steady-state workforce ratio is lower. This implies that the net-
work effects occurring at an increasing rate leads to country D having a relatively
lower workforce, and also relatively lower wages than country F . If network ef-
fects occurred at a decreasing rate, then country D will end up having a higher
workforce, and also face higher wages compared to the previous case. We can then
note from this simple exercise that network effects taking place at a slower rate
leads to a more favorable outcome for the migrant-sending country as it faces rela-
tively higher wages compared to the other case. However, for the migrant-receiving
country, at steady-state, they face a more favorable outcome under network effects
taking place at a faster rate as they result in having a relatively higher workforce,
and relatively higher wages at steady state.
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Given this scenario of persistent migration where network effects take place,
it is then of more interest to explore how network effects take place and the rate
at which it may increase potential migrants. As is the case in many migration
corridors, network formation is a part of the migration process and assessing the
specifics of how network effects occur may bring in more comprehensive results
regarding its long-run impact on the host and home countries.
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4.3 Conclusions
A model of persistent migration enables network effects to take place and we can
therefore analyze the effects on the workforce ratios as well as the wage ratios
between the two countries involved. With the assumption that a larger migrant
network leads to positive externalities of a potential migrant via an increase in
the probability of migration, the effects on migration flow are the same, albeit the
analysis is different and is also dependent on the specific functional form of how
network effects take place and determine the probability of migration.
First, we observe a higher proportion of the population that does intend to
migrate in the subsequent time periods. This is a very basic result and relies
heavily on the functional form of the probability of migration. To our knowledge,
however, that this is shown for a model of persistent migration when the choice
of migration is endogenous is perhaps new to the literature.
Second, the impact on the workforce ratio in the next period between the two
countries is lower, implying that the source country has a relatively lower workforce
than the destination country. In this case, under the assumption of homogenous
labor, when comparing the size of the workforce, the size of the migrant-sending
country’s workforce is, thus, relatively smaller than if there were no network ef-
fects. This implies that persistent migration leads to the migrant-sending country
having a relatively smaller workforce, simply due to the effect of the network en-
couraging a larger outflow of emigrants, and over time, also experiences relatively
lower wages. The divergence is thus hastened with network effects.
At steady state, however, the results may vary. The effect on the steady-state
workforce and wage ratios may vary depending on how the probability of migra-
tion is affected by the network effects. It may either be more favorable for the
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migrant-sending country, i.e. the workforce and the wage differentials are smaller,
or it may be favorable for the migrant-receiving country, i.e. they have a much
higher workforce and face higher wages.
Numerically, we show how this may occur. When the network effects occur at
a slower rate, it is favorable for the home country and when the network effects
occur at a faster rate, it is more favorable for the host country. Hence, for host
countries, a strong network formation process of their immigrants is better in that
they have relatively higher wages at steady state. Whereas for the home country,
a slower process of network formation becomes more favorable. While network
effects enhance the chances of potential migrants of working in the country of
their choice for a few generations, at steady state, they are better off with a slow
occurrence of network effects.
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